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Deference Lotteries
Jud Mathews*
When should courts defer to agency interpretationsof statutes, and what
measure of deference should agencies receive? Administrative law recognizes
two main deference doctrines-the generous Chevron standard and the stingier
Skidmore standard-butSupreme Court case law has not offered a bright-line
rulefor when each standardapplies.
Many observers have concluded that courts' deference practice is an
unpredictablemuddle. This Article argues that it is really a lottery, in the sense
the term is used in expected utility theory. Agencies cannot predict which
deference standarda court will apply or with what effect, but they have a sense
for how probable the different possible outcomes are. This Article presents
empirical support for the "deference lottery" hypothesis, and then conducts a
simple game theory analysis to understandhow judicial review bears on agency
behavior in statutory interpretationunder deference lottery conditions.
The Article concludes that, in fact, the deference lottery can function as a
flexible tool for managing agency behavior. The lottery can curb agency
opportunism by imposing a risk that agencies' interpretationsof statutes will
face elevated scrutiny rather than Chevron deference. This analysis offers a new
perspective on deference doctrine, and in particular on the Supreme Court's
Mead decision, which sets out the standardfor when Chevron applies. Mead's
vagueness, widely derived as a bug, may in fact be a feature. Still, the deference
lottery can backfire badly if Skidmore is applied too stringently, as the Article
shows.
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Introduction

When should courts defer to agency interpretations of statutes and what
measure of deference should agencies receive?
Administrative law
recognizes two main deference doctrines-the generous Chevron' standard
and the stingier Skidmore2 standard 3-but Supreme Court case law has not
offered a bright-line rule for which standard applies when.4 Further, even
when a court purports to operate within a given deference regime, it is not
clear that the standards are applied consistently from case to case.5 Empirical
work has confirmed that courts often fail to apply deference standards in
circumstances where their own doctrine indicates they should. Moreover,
courts continue to apply other deference doctrines in special contexts, driving

1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
3. Under Chevron, courts are to accept any "permissible" (meaning reasonable) agency
construction of an ambiguous statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. When Skidmore applies, a court
gives deference on a sliding scale: an agency's interpretation will be credited in proportion to its
"power to persuade." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. The standards are discussed in more detail below.
See infra Part II.
4. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001) (holding that Chevron deference
is due when it is "apparent" that "Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the
force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law," but
declining to set out conclusive criteria for establishing the requisite congressional intent).
5. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failedand Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 809-22 (2010) (detailing
inconsistencies in the application of Chevron); Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1458-64 (2005) (describing
inconsistencies in when appeals courts apply different deference doctrines).
6. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090
(2008); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An
EmpiricalStudy of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1727,
1740 (2010).
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the predictability of judicial practice further down.] Taken together, all this
means that agencies seeking to defend statutory interpretations in court can
anticipate with confidence neither what standard will be applied nor how the
court will apply it.
The confused state of deference doctrine has attracted its share of
critical commentary.! The Supreme Court's 2001 United States v. Mead
Corp.9 decision, which declined to mark off the border between Chevron's
domain and Skidmore's with a bright-line rule, has been a focal point for
criticism.' 0 To be sure, a lack of clarity over the scope of deference an
agency interpretation will receive-an unpredictability in the law
generally-imposes costs." Here, the costs of an unpredictable deference

7. Although Chevron and Skidmore are the deference standards most often employed, the Court
has articulated a number of other deference standards for use in specialized contexts. See Eskridge
& Baer, supra note 6, at 1090 (identifying five distinct modes of deference to agency
interpretations, including Seminole Rock, Curtiss-Wright, and Beth Israel). Work on deference
doctrines in the lower federal courts has revealed a similarly variegated picture. See Jason J.
Czarnezki, An EmpiricalInvestigation ofJudicialDecisionmaking,Statutory Interpretation,and the
Chevron Doctrine in EnvironmentalLaw, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 767, 770-71 (2008) (observing that
"there remains much confusion and conflation in the circuits over how to apply the Chevron
doctrine").
8. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 215-16 (2006) (characterizing Mead as "close to disastrous on
institutional grounds" owing to the "cognitive and institutional load that the increasing complexity
of Mead's legal regime imposes on lower courts, litigants, and other actors"); David J. Barron &
Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 205 (arguing that "the
Court's reliance on congressional intent should give way to a frankly policy-laden assessment of the
appropriate allocation of power in the administrative state" and "that the underlying policy
evaluation of the Court misidentifies the criteria that should govern this allocation by focusing on
the presence of formal procedures and generality"); Beermann, supra note 5, at 788-835 (detailing
inconsistencies in the application of Chevron); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58
DUKE L.J. 549, 549 (2009) (contending that Chevron "asks courts to determine whether Congress
has delegated to administrative agencies the authority to resolve questions about the meaning of
statutes that those agencies implement, but. . . does not give courts the tools for providing a proper
answer"); William S. Jordan, III, JudicialReview ofInformal Statutory Interpretations:The Answer
is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN, L. REV. 719, 719 (2002) (describing the
Court's current approach to the review of administrative agencies' informal statutory interpretations
as "a cumbersome, unworkable regime under which courts must draw increasingly fine distinctions
using impossibly vague standards").
9. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
10. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 5, at 1143-44 (endorsing the view that Mead caused judicial
review of agency action to "devolve into chaos"); William S. Jordan, Ill, United States v. Mead:
Complicating the Delegation Dance, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11425, 11425 (2001) (opining that Mead
obscured Chevron's "treasured clarity"); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and
Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 809 (2002) (arguing that both
the majority and the dissent in Mead were mistaken); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the
Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 347 (2003) (arguing that the flaws and incoherencies in the
case law applying Mead "are traceable to the flaws, fallacies, and confusions of the Mead decision
itself').
11. Foundational works on the effects of uncertain legal standards include Richard Craswell &
John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986) and
Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in
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regime might include increased litigation,12 more agency reversals in court,
"defensive rulemaking" on the part of agencies,14 or perhaps a move away
from rulemaking entirely.' 5 A fuller accounting of our deference practice,
however, should consider whether unpredictability might yield benefits as
well as costs. This Article begins that work.
The key to this Article's unique contributions is the insight that agencies
face a "deference lottery" when they advance a statutory interpretation in a
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. 6 The Article uses
the term "lottery" in the sense it is used in expected utility theory. A person
faces a lottery any time he or she does not know what the outcome of a
process will be, but does know what the different possible outcomes are and
what the probability of each is.' 7 In more formal terms, a lottery refers to
any discrete probability distribution over outcomes.' For instance, if I buy a
scratch-off lottery ticket, obviously I do not know what its payoff will be, but
I do know the odds (if I read the fine print on the back). For instance, the
ticket may pay $1,000 with a probability of 1-in-10,000, $1,000,000 with a
probability of 1-in-10,000,000, and $0 with a probability of 9,989,999-inWe frequently encounter lotteries outside of the gaming
10,000,000.
context as well. For instance, based on historical averages, we expect that an
A-rated municipal bond will pay its face value with .97 probability and
default with .03 probability.20

the Law, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 541 (1994), Notable recent works include Yuval Feldman & Shahar
Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty,LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2011, at 133.
12. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Iln an era when federal statutory law
administered by federal agencies is pervasive, and when the ambiguities (intended or unintended)
that those statutes contain are innumerable, totality-of-the-circumstances Skidmore deference is a
recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation.").
13. Id.
14. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on
Management, Games, and Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 185, 203
(referring not to the deference lottery, but to the unpredictability generally engendered by
aggressive judicial review of agency rulemakings).
15. Id.

16. These are situations where, after Mead, Chevron applies presumptively but not definitively.
As a shorthand, I sometimes refer to "agency statutory interpretations" to mean statutory
interpretations rendered in these formats. The Article focuses on this subset of agency statutory
interpretations because the most important agency decisions are likely to be taken pursuant to one of
these procedures, as opposed to less formal forms of agency action.
17. This somewhat technical usage is uncommon, though not unknown, in legal scholarship.
See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Delegation Lottery, 119 HARV. L. REv. F. 105 (2006).
18. See MARTIN J.OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 501 (2004) ("We refer to a
probability distribution over outcomes as a lottery over outcomes."). For a more in-depth and
technical discussion, see NOLAN MCCARTY & ADAM MEIROWITZ, POLITICAL GAME THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 27-33 (2007).

19. For the actual odds from a popular multistate lottery, see Powerball-Prizesand Odds,
POWERBALL, http://www.powerball.com/powerball/pb prizes.asp.
20. H.R. REP. NO. 110-835, at 5 (2008).
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How does the lottery concept translate to the administrative law
context? I argue that courts' deference practice contains two distinct sources
of unpredictability that combine to generate a lottery with distinctive
features. When an agency advances a statutory interpretation in a noticeand-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, it can reliably predict
neither which standard of review will be applied to its statutory
interpretation-Chevron or Skidmore-nor, if Chevron deference is not
granted, whether or not its interpretation will survive review. However, from
observing judicial practice and doctrine, the agency can have a fairly good
sense for both the ex ante odds of getting Chevron review and for the odds a
given interpretation would survive Skidmore review.
In the terminology of this Article, agencies thus face a deference lottery
that is a composite of two lotteries, which I refer to as the Chevron lottery
and the Skidmore lottery. 2' The core idea is that an agency interpretation
faces some probability of receiving Chevron deference on review (the
Chevron lottery), and in the event that Chevron is not forthcoming, some
probability of surviving judicial scrutiny under Skidmore (the Skidmore
lottery). This structure gives courts two levers over agencies: they can tweak
the Chevron lottery-altering the probability that agencies will be reviewed
under Chevron-and the Skidmore lottery-adjusting the stringency of
review within the Skidmore framework when Chevron analysis is not
forthcoming.
Of course, it is not only deference law that could be characterized as a
lottery. Laws are rarely fully determinate and the outcomes of judicial
processes can almost never be predicted with certainty. But the lottery
characterization is especially apt here, as the quantum of unpredictability in
deference issues is especially high.22 Moreover, the deference lottery has
some distinctive and interesting properties, owing to the structure of
deference doctrine.
This Article explores what follows if we take seriously the idea that,
from the perspective of agencies, the deference regime is a lottery. It makes
three significant contributions. First, it provides empirical evidence that the
"deference lottery" is a reasonable characterization of how agencies
experience judicial review. Part II surveys the development of deference
doctrine, highlighting its sources of uncertainty, and then examines how
deference is actually practiced in the courts. Drawing on existing empirical
studies of deference practice in both the Supreme Court and the federal
appellate courts, this Article identifies evidence that a deference lottery with
the features described here approximates the environment that agencies

21. The term for a lottery with outcomes that are themselves lotteries is "compound lottery."
CHRISTIAN GOLLIER, THE EcoNoMics OF RISK AND TIME 4 (2001).

22. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1091 (observing that "there is no clear guide as to
when the Court will invoke particular deference regimes, and why").
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actually face on judicial review.23 This is the first work to characterize
courts' deference practice in these terms and to offer support for the claim.
Second, the Article uses the concept of the deference lottery to unlock
new insights into how unpredictability in our deference regime can reward or
punish agency behavior in important, and sometimes counterintuitive, ways.
The method this Article adopts is to explore the dynamics of the deference
lottery using a simple model of agency-court interactions. This approach
adopts the perspective of Principal-Agent (PA) theory.2 4 It treats the agency
as the agent of an enacting Congress, tasked with carrying out a statutory
regime but subject to the classic agency problem: the agency's preferences
may diverge from those encoded in the statute and the enacting Congressthe principal-has limited tools for keeping the agency on track.25 On this
view, judicial review of agency statutory interpretations is understood as a
strategy for monitoring agency performance.
The stylized model of the deference lottery developed in this Article
generates surprising implications for administrative law. The first is that,
relative to a Chevron-only regime, the deference lottery offers a more
flexible tool for shaping agency behavior. A deference lottery can encourage
a rational agency to choose an interpretation that lies somewhere between the
safest and the most adventurous version that the agency can hope to get away
with. This Article takes no position on what kind of interpretation is bestthat is, on what is the optimal level of agency slack in the statutory
interpretation context. Rather, the Article shows that a deference lottery
opens possibilities for shaping agency behavior that are not available under a
Chevron-only regime. In this way, the Article casts a new, and more
favorable, light on Mead. To the extent that unpredictability in the deference
regime can have desirable effects, the much-maligned vagueness of Mead
may be a feature, not a bug.
The Article also shows how subtle changes to the deference lottery
could have pronounced-and undesirable--effects on agency behavior. One
of the most striking findings is that, paradoxically, increasing the scrutiny an
agency will receive under Skidmore can actually encourage an agency to
adopt a less faithful interpretation of the statute. The reason is this: if
Skidmore deference is very difficult to satisfy, at a certain point, the expected
rewards from compromising on policy are so meager that it makes sense for
an agency to give up its effort to "win" the Skidmore lottery entirely.
Instead, the expected benefit is higher from selecting an interpretation the

23. See infra subpart II(B).
24, For the classic introduction to Principal-Agent theory, as relevant to the public law context,
see Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. Sci. 739, 756-58 (1984).
25. For further discussion of the PA logic at work in this Article, and of how the analysis
accommodates the President's role in executing statutes, see infra Part III.
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agency prefers and "betting it all" on the Chevron lottery. 26 A strategy to
avoid this outcome is to construct a deference regime in which a fairly
deferential Skidmore standard is applied fairly frequently. The Article offers
some reasons to think that this is the kind of deference regime federal
agencies face.
The third major contribution of the Article is to the body of work on
uncertainty and risk in the law generally. 27 This piece builds on a research
agenda that has identified, in general terms, both the potential behaviorshaping value of vagueness in the law28 and some of its limits. 29 This Article
advances the state of scholarship with respect to both the scope of application
and the development of theory. This is the first piece to explore at length
how the unpredictability of the deference regime in administrative law bears
on agencies' strategies of statutory interpretation. As such, it brings a new
perspective to the extensive legal literature on judicial review of agency
statutory interpretation.
Moreover, the Article explores the dynamics of a doctrinal structure that
generalizes beyond administrative law. The scenario this Article analyzes is
one where a court will evaluate conduct within one of two possible regimes,
where one is relatively permissive and the other relatively stringent, and the
decision which regime applies is governed by a vague standard (here, the
Mead test). This research in principle translates to other doctrinal settings
with the same features: for instance, to corporate law, where courts possess
two standards that could plausibly be used to evaluate certain actions of
directors and officers-the forgiving business judgment rule and the strict
duty of loyaltyso-and the standard for when each applies is opaque.3

26. The point has some parallels to Richard Craswell and John E. Calfee's conclusion about the
deterrent value of unpredictability. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 11, at 287 (positing a
counterintuitive, inverse relation between certainty and compliance incentives in certain criminal
law contexts).
27. Economists often make a distinction between risk and uncertainty. FRANK H. KNIGHT,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197-232 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1921). Actors face risk
when they do not know which event will occur, but they know the relative probabilities of the
possible events; they face uncertainty when they do not even know the probabilities. See Daniel A.
Farber, Uncertainty,99 GEO. L.J. 901, 903 (2011) (reiterating this distinction); Sarah B. Lawsky,
Probably? Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1026-31 (2009)
(building on this dichotomy). This distinction is not always drawn in the law and economics
scholarship, however, and for simplicity of exposition and consistency with ordinary usage, this
Article sometimes refers to the "uncertainty" in deference doctrine even though its analysis
supposes that the frequencies of different outcomes are knowable.
28. See Hadfield, supra note 11, at 548-49 (suggesting that vague legal standards might elicit a
more socially desirable mix of behaviors than determinate standards).
29. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 11, at 287 (finding that, contrary to the authors' prior
conjecture, "it is not necessarily true that reductions in the level of uncertainty will improve
[defendants'] compliance decisions").
30. On the development of these standards, see Marcia M. McMurray, Note, An Historical
Perspectiveon the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 605, 606-18, 623-28 (1987).
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The rest of the Article is structured as follows. Part II combines
doctrinal and empirical analysis to show that the deference lottery concept
reasonably approximates how agencies experience judicial review of their
statutory interpretations. Part III develops a simple model of how the
configuration of the deference lottery can shape agencies' strategies of
statutory interpretation, and presents the key results. Part IV considers the
applicability and limitations of the Part III analysis, suggests some
implications for administrative law, and concludes.
II.

Deference in Doctrine; Deference in Fact

This Part establishes that the judicial review environment for agency
statutory interpretations can meaningfully be characterized as a deference
lottery. In other words, in any individual case, agencies cannot predict with
confidence either what standard the court will apply or, in the event slidingscale Skidmore deference is applied, whether or not the court will uphold its
interpretation, but the relative frequencies of the different possible outcomes
are fairly stable over time. This Article does not claim that agencies face a
perfect lottery, where the odds are known with certainty, and certainly does
not claim that courts make their deference decisions by choosing at random
from among the possible outcomes. 32 Below, I detail the ways in which the
experience of agencies facing judicial review may diverge from a true
lottery. What I am claiming is that, from the perspective of the agency, the
experience of judicial review in the statutory interpretation context
reasonably approximates a lottery.
A.

Deference Doctrine

This subpart summarizes the development of deference doctrine in
administrative law. This story has been told before, sometimes in great
detail.34 This account emphasizes a persistent theme: the Supreme Court's
oscillation between clarity and obscurity in deference standards. More than
once, the Supreme Court has established a fairly straightforward policy
regarding the deference due to agencies, only to chafe under its rigidity and
introduce more nuance.
The early decades of modem administrative law saw the Supreme Court
swing from one pole to the other in its approach towards statutory
31. Cf Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 437, 461-67 (1993) (clarifying the various
standards applied by courts to corporate decisions and elaborating a framework for understanding
the methodology by which judges apply these standards). Thanks to Larry Ribstein for this point.
32. The Article, however, considers reasons why it is not surprising that judicial behavior in the
aggregate approximates a lottery. See infra subpart II(C).
33. See infra section II(B)(1).
34. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of
New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REv. 399 (2007) (recounting the development of
deference in administrative law since the New Deal).
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interpretation by agencies. The Court reserved for itself the authority to
define key terms of regulatory statutes, such as "unfair methods of
competition in commerce" (in the FTC Act), into the 1920s, 35 but by the New
Deal era had largely adopted a policy of broad deference to agency
interpretations.3 6 In Gray v. Powell,3 7 the Supreme Court heard a challenge
to the National Bituminous Coal Commission's determination that the
Seaboard Air Line Railway Company was a consumer of coal only, and not
also a "producer" within the meaning of the Bituminous Coal Code. The
Court sharply limited the scope of its own review of the agency's
interpretation:
In a matter left specifically by Congress to the determination of an
administrative body, . . . the function of review placed upon the courts
... is fully performed when they determine that there has been a fair

hearing, with notice and an opportunity to present the circumstances
and arguments to the decisive body, and an application of the statute
in a just and reasoned manner.
Where, as here, a determination has been left to an administrative
body, this delegation will be respected and the administrative
conclusion left untouched....
. . . Just as in the Adkins case the determination of the sweep of the
term "bituminous coal" was for this same administrative agency, so
here there must be left to it, subject to the basic prerequisites of lawful
adjudication, the determination of "producer."39
Gray seems to demote the Court, leaving it only to check that the
agency's interpretation followed proper process and represented a "just and
reasoned" application of the statute.
The Court took a similar approach in its well-known decision three
years later in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,Inc.,4 0 upholding the NLRB's
determination that newsboys are "employees" within the meaning of the
National Labor Relations Act.4 1 While reserving to the courts a leading role

35. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
36. For a detailed account, see Schiller, supra note 34, at 407-12, 430-38. As Schiller notes,
the Court's practice was not entirely uniform in any period; for instance, the Court more vigorously
policed the activity of agencies operating on the periphery of traditional police powers. Id. at 40709; see also Reuel Schiller, "Saint George and the Dragon": Courts and the Development of the
AdministrativeState in Twentieth-CenturyAmerica, 17 J. POL'Y HIST. 110, 113 (2005) (arguing that
courts were most deferential to agencies in "areas of regulation that fit comfortably within a
traditional reading of the police powers").
37. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
38. Id. at 403-06.
39. Id. at 411-13 (citations omitted).
40. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
41. Id. at 132.
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in questions of abstract statutory interpretation, 42 "where the question is one
of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the
agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing
court's function is limited."4 3 More specifically, "the Board's determination
that specified persons are 'employees' under this Act is to be accepted if it
has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law."" Even more
striking, as Reuel Schiller has noted, federal appeals courts during the same
period frequently deferred to agency interpretations on matters of
constitutional law, most notably, First Amendment issues raised by
administrative practices.45 In the immediate aftermath of the New Deal,
federal courts thus generally adopted a policy of broad deference to agency
statutory interpretations.46
The Court's decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 4 7 decided later in
1944, reflects a more contextual approach to deference. Here, the question
was whether nights that private firefighters spent on call and on premises at
the Swift plant counted as "working time" for purposes of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.4 8 The statute routed disputes under the Act to the courts, not
the Labor Department, but the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division
had issued an "Interpretive Bulletin" containing a standard for calculating
working time and filed an amicus curiae brief on the firemen's behalf.49 The
district court had reviewed the question de novo, not taking the agency's
position into account.o In an opinion by Justice Jackson, the Supreme Court
ruled that the district court had failed to give proper consideration to the
agency's views on the subject, and remanded.51 How much deference was
owed exactly? The Court offered this formula:

42. See id. at 130-31 ("Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when
arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate
weight to the judgment of those whose special duty it is to administer the questioned statute.").
43. Id. at 131. For a similar, contemporaneous approach with language that prefigures
Chevron, see Dobson v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). There the Court
held that the tax court's interpretation of whether certain settlement proceeds qualified as "income"
need only "have 'warrant in the record' and a rational basis in the law." Id. at 501.
44. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 131.
45. See Schiller, supra note 34, at 436-38 (noting circuit court deference to NLRB decisions
punishing employers for statements made during union elections); Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech
and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern FirstAmendment, 86 VA. L.
REv. 1, 96-101 (2000) (arguing that scarcity of available broadcast stations and a belief in agency
expertise led the Supreme Court to defer to the FCC's content-based regulation of speech).
46. See Schiller, supra note 34, at 429-38 (discussing judicial deference to administrative
findings in the 1930s and 1940s).
47. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
48. Id. at 135-36.
49. Id. at 138-39.
50. See id. at 140 ("[A]lthough the District Court referred to the Administrator's Bulletin, its
evaluation and inquiry were apparently restricted by its notion that waiting time may not be work,
an understanding of the law which we hold to be erroneous.").
5 1. Id.

2013]

Deference Lotteries

1359

We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control.52
The Skidmore formula tailors the deference owed to the infinite variety
of individual cases. From early on, Skidmore has divided opinion between
those who appreciate its sensitivity to context5 3 and those who lament its
open-endedness and question how it is to be administered consistently. 54
The Supreme Court continued to refine its deference jurisprudence,ss
but "revolutionary" change56 came forty years after Skidmore, in Chevron
In deciding
U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.s5
whether to permit the EPA's interpretation of "stationary source" to apply to
entire facilities rather than individual smokestacks, the Court inaugurated
its famous two-step approach to deference decisions:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court

52. Id.
53. See Reginald Parker, Administrative Interpretations, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 533, 538 (1951)
(describing Skidmore as "the golden middle" between approaches that abdicate courts' authority to
review or usurp agencies' authority to interpret.).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Skidmore deference is a recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation."); Melissa
Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1937,
1945 (2006) (noting the "open-ended and malleable" nature of the Skidmore standard).
55. For examples of the Court's less-structured post-Skidmore, pre-Chevron deference cases,
see Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978), Nat'1 Muffler Dealers Ass'n v.
United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1979), and Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977).
56. Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have noted, but do not themselves subscribe to,
the common view in administrative law scholarship that Chevron amounted to a revolution. See
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 834-35 (2001)
("[W]e accept for present purposes the Chevron revolution as an established fact. . . ."). They and
others have emphasized Chevron's roots in existing precedents. See id. at 833 ("The idea that
deference on questions of law is sometimes required was not new."). Indeed, already in the late
1940s, Professor Nathaniel Nathanson had identified a nascent doctrine "which teaches that there
are occasions when the reviewing court need not be persuaded that the administrative agency's
choice of conflicting interpretations is right, but only that it is reasonable." Nathaniel L. Nathanson,
AdministrativeDiscretion in the InterpretationofStatutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 470, 470 (1950),
57. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
58. Id. at 840.
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determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.59
On the face of it, Chevron appeared to jettison the complexities of
Skidmore in favor of two yes-or-no questions: is the statute ambiguous, and if
so, is the agency's interpretation "permissible," i.e., reasonable?6 0 Chevron
attracted limited notice at first, but after its enthusiastic adoption by the
D.C. Circuit62 and its increasing popularity on the Supreme Court itself,63 its
potential to broaden the scope of deference and simplify the analysis quickly
became apparent.
But Chevron's simple formula concealed difficult
questions,64 including the matter of "Step Zero": the question of Chevron's
scope.65 Does Chevron apply to every statutory interpretation advanced by
an agency or only some subset? And what analysis governs cases that do not
get Chevron review?
As the Court took up these questions, the contours of deference doctrine
became harder to follow. In Christensen v. Harris County,66 the Court
voiced a hard-line approach to Chevron's scope: "Interpretations such as
those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of
law--do not warrant Chevron-style deference." 67 Rather, they are analyzed
under Skidmore.68
The following term, in Mead, the Supreme Court rejected Christensen's
proposition that the test for Chevron was the formality of the agency
pronouncement. Returning to the stated rationale for deference in Chevron,
Justice Souter in Mead wrote that Chevron deference is due whenever

59. Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
60. See id, at 844 ("In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.").
61. For his part, Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, regarded the opinion as merely a
restatement of existing law. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an
Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399, 420 & n.76 (Peter L. Strauss ed.,
2006).
62. Id. at 422-23.
63. Id. at 421-23.
64. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 56, at 848-52 (cataloguing questions about Chevron's
scope). Even in cases where it is clear that Chevron applies, the core terms of the Chevron test are
hardly self-defining: what does it mean for a statute to be "ambiguous" or for an interpretation to be
"reasonable"?
65. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 191 (2006).
66. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
67. Id. at 587.
68. Id.
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"Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law
when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted
law." 69 The formality of the agency's interpretation is relevant to this
inquiry, but not dispositive. Authorization from Congress to engage in
rulemaking or adjudication is "a very good indicator of delegation meriting
Chevron treatment," 70 but "we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron
deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none
was afforded." 7 The key question, though, is always one of congressional
intent: did Congress mean for the agency, rather than the court, to be
interpreting the statute? Mead offered little guidance, however, into how that
Justice Souter catalogued indicia of
inquiry should be conducted.
classification rulings' informality before pronouncing them "beyond the
Chevron pale," 72 but did not explain which features, if any, were dispositive.
As Thomas Merrill concludes, Mead offers "an undefined standard that
invites consideration of a number of variables of indefinite weight."73 Mead
also confirmed that when Chevron does not apply, Skidmore deference
does.
Mead's majority opinion prompted a scathing dissent from Justice
Scalia, who predicted that its "wonderfully imprecise" test would generate
"protracted confusion."75 Mead's reception among administrative law
scholars was scarcely more hospitable. The opinion was judged "opaque
even by Justice Souter's standards" 77 and faulted for "provid[ing] little
guidance to lower courts, agencies, and regulated parties about how to
discern congressional intent in any given set of circumstances."7 8 The
Court's 2002 decision in Barnhart v. Walton79 did little to clear up the
confusion. That case concerned an interpretation of the Social Security Act
that the Social Security Administration advanced first in a variety of informal
formats over several decades and ultimately in a notice-and-comment
regulation.so In determining that Chevron provided the correct standard of

69. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
70. Id.

71. Id. at 231.
72. Id. at 234. The features Justice Souter noted included the large number of rulings issued
each year from multiple offices, the rulings' limited precedential value, and the lack of supporting
evidence in the legislative history that these rulings were intended to have binding legal authority.
Id. at 231-34.
73. Merrill, supra note 10, at 813.
74. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-38.
75. Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
77. Vermeule, supra note 10, at 347.
78. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 HARv. L. REv. 467, 480 (2002).
79. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
80. Id. at 217, 219-20.
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deference, Justice Breyer's decision for the Court considered a laundry list of
factors:
In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related
expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration,
and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a
long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate
legal lens through which to view the legality of the Agency
-81
interpretation here at issue.
Barnhart thus introduced a set of factors to govern the threshold
question of whether Chevron deference applies that resembles, at least
loosely, the Skidmore analysis.8 2 Though Barnharthas been cited hundreds
of times by the lower courts, in none of the eight cases in which the Supreme
83
Court cites to Barnhart
does the Court in fact follow its full framework for
Chevron Step Zero analysis.
Subsequent cases have made further refinements to the deference
regime,84 but have not changed its basic architecture. Whether an agency
statutory interpretation warrants Chevron or Skidmore deference, then, turns
on an inquiry into congressional intent: did Congress mean for the agency to
be able to decide the issue at hand with the force of law? If so, Chevron
governs, and if not, Skidmore does. The Court has neither repudiated nor
consistently applied its framework from Barnhart, which incorporates
agency expertise, the scope of the legal question, the length of the agency's
experience, and other factors into this threshold determination.s In the event
that Skidmore applies, the agency stands a better shot of surviving review the
more persuasive its interpretation is.
B.

The Data on Courts'DeferencePractices

This subpart turns from doctrine to data, to consider what is known
about how the Chevron/Skidmore regime functions in practice. It draws from
several important empirical studies of judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations that have appeared in the past five years. The data and
analysis assembled in this subpart are not comprehensive, and cannot answer
all questions about how the deference regime operates in practice. But they
offer a picture, however incomplete, of the deference landscape that agencies

81. Id. at 222.
82. See supra text accompanying note 52.
83. As of April 2, 2013.
84. Many commentators had concluded, in the wake of Mead, that agency use of formal
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures were sufficient, if not necessary, to
guarantee Chevron deference. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 65, at 218. In his BrandX
concurrence, Justice Breyer clarified his view that such formal procedures were not sufficient to
guarantee Chevron deference. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
85. See supra text accompanying note 83.

2013]

Deference Lotteries

1363

face. And what they show is broadly consistent with this Article's claim that
the courts' practice amounts to a deference lottery.
1. Deference in the Supreme Court.-Not surprisingly, deference

practice in the Supreme Court has been the object of the most intensive
study, starting with the landmark 1990 article by Peter Schuck and Donald
Elliott.86 The most comprehensive source on Supreme Court deference to
agency statutory interpretations yet assembled is a dataset constructed by
William Eskridge and Lauren Baer.87 Eskridge and Baer studied every
Supreme Court case involving an agency interpretation of a statute between
the Chevron decision and the end of the 2005 Term, 1,014 in all.88 They
coded each case on 156 variables that capture most of the issues one would
expect to be relevant to the deference given by the Court.89 This dataset is
the richest available for exploring how deference plays out in practice, and it
forms the basis for the analysis here.
That said, the fact that the data is from Supreme Court cases only limits
the generalizability of the results. First, while Supreme Court opinions of
course are the most authoritative, as a matter of volume the Supreme Court
has a much less active role in shaping the contours of administrative law than
the lower courts.90 To the extent that agencies shape their behavior in
response to cues they get from courts, agencies would be well advised to pay
attention to practices in the circuit courts, as agencies are much more likely
to have their rules reviewed there than in the Supreme Court.
Second, the pool of cases decided by the Supreme Court likely shows
strong "selection effects"91 : they cannot be viewed as a representative sample
of the entire population of agency statutory interpretation cases. With
plenary control over the certiorari power, the Supreme Court can grant
review to whichever cases it wishes, and those that attract the Court's

86. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE LJ. 984. For a fuller review of empirical studies on
Supreme Court deference practice, see Raso & Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1739-42.
87. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6; Raso & Eskridge, supra note 6. The dataset is available
in the IQSS Dataverse Network and on file with the author. See Replication Data For: The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom
Chevron
to
Hamdan,
IQSS,
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/faces/study/
StudyPage.xhtml?globalld=hdl: 1902.1/16562&studyListinglndex=0_354424ece633571dl5582456
6165.
88. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1094. The Raso and Eskridge article uses a 667-case
subset of this dataset, consisting of all cases where the agency interpretation at issue was not
advanced for the first time in the course of litigation. See Raso and Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1741.
89. For a listing and explanation of the variables, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 120324.
90. See Peter L. Strauss, One HundredFifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for JudicialReview of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095
(1987) (demonstrating the infrequency with which the Supreme Court reviews lower court decisions
and observing the freedom this gives to lower courts to alter existing law).
91. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1096-97.
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attention are likely to be an exceptional bunch. As Eskridge and Baer point
out, these probably include a disproportionate share of the most difficult
cases,92 and they may be aberrant for other reasons as well. As a result, we
cannot assume that these cases offer a reliable guide to how the federal
judiciary as a whole applies deference.
Third, although the dataset is large, the number of potentially relevant
variables is large as well, meaning it is difficult to draw firm conclusions
about which (if any) factors bear on the Court's practice of deference. 94
Once we drill down to see how results vary by individual agency or subject
matter area, for instance, we have few cases in any given condition,95 making
it difficult to tell whether variations in outcome reflect systematic differences
or random noise. When we look only at challenges to notice-and-comment
regulations and formal adjudications-the focus of attention in this Articlethe dearth of data is even more acute.96
Finally, these data provide limited leverage for answering the important
question of how much, and what kind of, scrutiny the Court is applying under
Chevron and Skidmore. If the Chevron lottery is, in fact, a lottery-that is, if
agencies cannot reliably anticipate which of their statutory interpretations
will be reviewed under Chevron as opposed to Skidmore-then a higher
survival rate among the former is evidence that Chevron review is more lax
than Skidmore, as the doctrine asserts.9
Without a measure of the
interpretive content of challenged rules, however, we cannot use these data to
evaluate the features of the Skidmore lottery-that is, to assess how the

92. Id.
93. See id. at 1097 ("Even less predictable is the effect of the much-touted 'Chevron
Revolution' ... on the kinds of cases that are litigated and appealed ... at the Supreme Court
level.").
94. As Eskridge and Baer point out, their dataset is not a "sample" at all, but rather the
complete universe of agency interpretation cases during the time period they study. But to the
extent their study provides a guide to the Court's conduct going forward, it is a time-specific
sample; one would think that patterns identified here would apply also to the years since 2006.
95. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, 1204-05 (displaying the results by agency and subject
matter).
96. To take one example, in the entire Eskridge and Baer dataset, there are only six cases in
which the statutory interpretation is advanced in a legislative rule from the Environmental
Protection Agency, and not all of these were attended by notice-and-comment procedures.
97. This is, in fact, what the data show. See infra note 106. This finding contradicts the claim
that similar reversal rates across different standards of review illustrate that the ostensibly different
standards amount, at base, to a single "reasonableness" standard. See David Zaring, Reasonable
Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 137 (2010) (arguing that Chevron and Skidmore deference
essentially amounts to a single "reasonableness" standard). If agencies are in a position to
anticipate which standard of review will be applied, the fact that agency survival rates hover around
70% under different standards of review need not mean that the various standards are equivalently
stringent. For instance, when agencies interpret statutes in guidance documents, they know they are
most likely to receive Skidmore deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234
(2001) (reaffirming Skidmore's holding that "an agency's interpretation may merit some
deference"). A rational strategy for the agency would be to avoid more adventurous interpretations
in guidance documents.
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probability of surviving review under Skidmore varies with the content of the
statutory interpretation. Fortunately, qualitative work on the courts of appeal
offers some insight into this question.98
All that being said, Eskridge and Baer's research broadly corroborates
this Article's characterization of the Chevron lottery. As Eskridge and Baer
themselves state, "Are there factors that predict ...

when particular

deference regimes will be invoked ...? [O]ur data offer little to latch onto;
there is no clear guide as to when the Court will invoke particular deference
regimes, and why." 99 This section now turns to explore what the data show
us in more detail.
First, the Eskridge and Baer data establish that the interpretations that
are the focus of this Article-those advanced in formal adjudications and
legislative rules issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking-are more
likely to get Chevron deference than those adopted through less formal
proceedings.' 00 The Court applied Chevron, or an equivalent or more
deferential standard (Beth Israel'o' or Curtiss-Wright'0 2 deference, in
Eskridge and Baer's terminology'03 ) in 44% of the cases involving statutory
interpretation through notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication.104 This compares to an application of Chevron or the
equivalent in only 5% of cases involving less formal interpretations. A
glance at these results makes clear, though, that even for these more formal
interpretations, agencies can hardly count on getting Chevron deference.
While the doctrine suggests a strong presumption that notice-and-comment
rules and formal adjudications will receive Chevron deference,'0 o the data
show a high probability that the Supreme Court may apply Skidmore
instead. 106

98. See infra section II(B)(2).
99. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1091.
100. Id. at 1149 tbl.18.
101. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
102. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
103. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1098. Eskridge and Baer also list Seminole Rock
deference as a standard more deferential to agencies than Chevron, but it is inapplicable here
because it applies only to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations, not statutes. Id.
104. In discussing Eskridge and Baer's data below, I use the terms "apply Chevron" and
"receive Chevron" as shorthands to mean that the Court approaches the statutory interpretation
question using the Chevron framework, or these equivalent or still more deferential standards. This
does not necessarily mean either that the Court finds the statutory language to be ambiguous or that
the Court accepts the agency's interpretation-although the model I develop in Part III starts from
the assumption that the agency wins when the Court applies Chevron, an assumption I later relax.
The figures appearing in this subpart are my own calculations based on Eskridge and Baer's data.
105. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001). But see Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(noting that observing the more formal procedures is not sufficient to guarantee Chevron's
application).
106. The agency's chances of winning before the Court are lower when Skidmore is applied
than when Chevron is applied. Of formal adjudications and notice-and-comment rulemakings in the
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Within this population of agency interpretations, are there features of
these rules that help explain whether Chevron or Skidmore can be applied?
Some agencies receive Chevron more frequently than others,10 7 and the
nature of the statutory grant of power has some correlation with the standard
applied,'08 but it is harder to find any factor within the agency's control that it
can manipulate to adjust its odds in the Chevron lottery.'0 9 One might think
that the politics of an interpretation could have some bearing on how it would
be reviewed, but the data do not bear this out. Eskridge and Baer coded each
agency action reviewed as liberal, conservative, or neutral/mixed."o An
interpretation is equally likely to receive Chevron consideration whether it
has a liberal or conservative interpretation. Conservative and liberal
interpretations also survive judicial review at the same rate."' Ultimately,
when we exclude the uncodeable or neutral interpretations, the politics of
agency interpretation have no statistically significant bearing on either the
deference regime or the agency's win rate.
Eskridge and Baer's data do identify one respect in which the content of
agency interpretations relates to the deference standard applied; and to the
extent this relationship is strong, the "Chevron lottery" characterization is
inexact. Eskridge and Baer evaluate whether an agency interpretation is
(1) long-standing and fairly stable, (2) evolving, or (3) recent."12 1 find that
the Court applied the Chevron framework somewhat more frequently, and
agencies won more often, when they maintained a long-standing and stable
interpretation. The Court applied Chevron 48% of the time when the agency
Supreme Court, agencies won 78% of those to which Chevron was applied, as opposed to 67% of
those to which Chevron was not applied.
107. For instance, the IRS receives Chevron for only 33% of its interpretations, while for the
Department of Health and Human Services, the figure is 74%. These agency-based discrepancies
are due in some part to subject-specific lines of doctrine that in some cases seem to be eroding. See,
e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 706-07 (2011)
(dropping the tax-specific National Mujler standard in favor of Chevron analysis for Treasury
regulations).
108. Eskridge and Baer code for different statutory grants of authority, and the strongest,
"Merrill-Watts" form of delegation-in which the agency is authorized to impose immediate
sanctions for violations of its rules or orders-is associated with a higher incidence of Chevron
deference. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1125-26, 1209-10; Merrill & Watts, supra note 78, at
582-86 (describing a way of interpreting congressional delegations of authority). Not surprisingly,
the forms of delegation also tend to vary systematically by agency. For instance the IRS lacks
"Merrill-Watts" delegation, and the Department of Health and Human Services frequently proceeds
under Merrill-Watts delegations of power. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1210.
109. The data do suggest, in addition, that the rate at which Chevron is applied varies somewhat
by agency, and also by whether the agencies are acting pursuant to an express delegation of
legislative power, which is substantially correlated with the former. These are thus examples of
variables that seem to vary systematically with the incidence of Chevron review, but they are not
factors that agencies are in a position to control.
110. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1205.
111. Conservative interpretations survive review 69.4% of the time, and liberal interpretations,
68.12% of the time.
112. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1206. In the analysis performed for this Article, both of
these latter two categories are recoded as representing a change in agency interpretation.
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interpretation advanced was continuous, and 40% of the time when the
interpretation was recent or evolving. If we ignore formal adjudications and
restrict our attention to notice-and-comment rulemakings, however, the
discrepancy is larger: continuous interpretations received Chevron review
51% of the time, compared to 35% for recent or evolving interpretations. A
statistical test suggests that the difference in frequency is larger than we
would expect to occur by chance." 3
This result is surprising, and goes unremarked on by Eskridge and Baer.
Under Mead, the continuity of an interpretation should have no bearing on
the appropriateness of Chevron review, although Barnhart,by contrast, lists
as one factor in the Chevron Step Zero analysis "careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time."l 4 The
discrepancy in Chevron application rates suggests that perhaps Barnhart,
though infrequently cited by the Supreme Court, may play a larger role in
guiding the Court's Chevron Step Zero analysis than generally recognized.
Alternatively, it raises the intriguing possibility that, if durability of an
interpretation is in some way a proxy for its "quality," the Court is
manipulating its deference analysis by applying Chevron as a cover in cases
where the Court in fact agrees with the interpretation on the merits. It falls
outside the scope of this project to investigate this possibility further. In any
event, whatever relevance continuity may have had to the Chevron Step Zero
analysis for notice-and-comment rulemakings, it appears to be on the wane.
The Court has moved in recent years to devalue continuity of agency practice
in administrative law more generally,"' and if we confine our attention to
cases decided since the 2000 Term (when Mead was decided), the trend
vanishes.
Moreover, it is important to note that the Eskridge-Baer data may
exaggerate the unpredictability of Chevron Step Zero decisions for reasons
having to do with the nature of common law decision making and the
organization of the federal courts. Once a court has determined which
deference standard governs a particular agency's interpretations of a
particular statute, the issue is settled, at least for that court and those bound
by its decisions. Over time, then, the set of cases subject to the Chevron
lottery could dwindle, as each ruling on what standard governs a given

113. Specifically, a Pearson chi-squared test yields a value of 5.1654, with an associated
probability of 0.023: in other words, if continuous and noncontinuous interpretations were in fact
treated the same way, we would expect to see a difference this large emerge by chance only 2.3% of
the time.
114. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); see also supra text accompanying note 81.
115. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810-12 (2009)
(explaining that an agency's change in position does not trigger a heightened standard of review and
does not require justifications for the new policy that is any "more substantial than those required to
adopt a policy in the first instance").
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agency/statute pairing eliminates uncertainty going forward."' 6 Also, the
Eskridge-Baer data concern deference practices in the Supreme Court only.
Unpredictability may be systematically higher in the Supreme Court than in
federal appeals courts, either because (1) issues of first impression form a
larger part of the Supreme Court's docket,"l 7 or (2) the Supreme Court is
more inclined than lower courts to deny Chevron review to notice-andcomment rulemakings or formal adjudications."
These concerns could diminish the aptness of the Chevron lottery as a
characterization of the environment agencies face on judicial review. How
seriously they undermine the lottery characterization is ultimately an
empirical question that I lack the data to answer adequately. Still, there are
reasons to think the Chevron lottery remains an appropriate metaphor
notwithstanding these concerns. First, while judicial decisions reduce
uncertainty about which standard applies in a particular context, Congress
continually replenishes the supply of uncertainty by establishing new statutes
and new agencies. Second, only the Supreme Court's rulings are binding on
all circuit courts, and the Supreme Court itself hears few administrative law
cases a term."l 9 Meanwhile, a baker's dozen of circuit courts continue to
review agency decisions, treating cases from sister circuits as persuasive
authority only. If unpredictability is being squeezed out of the deference
regime, it is being squeezed out gradually.
To sum up: the Eskridge-Baer data reveal that a significant proportion
of agency statutory interpretations adopted in notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudications receive Skidmore deference, even though
Mead suggests a strong presumption in favor of Chevron.'20 The data also
suggest that there is little a given agency can do to nudge its probability of
getting Chevron up or down in any particular rulemaking.12' The politics of
the interpretation have no bearing on the deference regime at all.12 2 The data
116. For instance, in the past few years, the Supreme Court has ruled that Chevron governs
Treasury regulations interpreting the tax code (Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011)), FCC regulations interpreting the Telecommunications Act (Nat'l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)), and Federal Reserve
Board regulations interpreting the Truth in Lending Act (Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig,
541 U.S. 232 (2004)). My thanks to Kristin Hickman for these examples.
117. See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin's Chain
Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1156, 1173 (2005) (explaining
that under path dependence theory, "initial cases of first impression allow great judicial freedom").
118. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1119-20 (speculating that the Court views deference
regimes as guides for lower courts, but is more flexible in its own decision to use such regimes).
119. See Strauss, supra note 90, at 1099 (stating that the Supreme Court hears only "a handful"
of such cases each year). The Supreme Court's docket has further fallen sharply since the
appearance of Strauss's article, over a quarter century ago.
120. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
121. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1137 (stating that "[t]he Court does not apply
deference regimes in a foreseeable manner" but instead "invokes deference regimes in a manner that
is seemingly sporadic and haphazard").
122. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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do suggest that an agency can increase its odds of Chevron, at least in the
notice-and-comment rulemaking context, by maintaining continuity in its
interpretation over time.1 23 To the extent this observed effect is real, it is at
odds with this Article's characterization of the Chevron lottery, an
environment in which the chances of getting Chevron are beyond the
agency's power to shape. That said, the evidence also suggests that
continuity no longer matters to the Court's choice of deference regime, even
if it did in the past. 124 On the whole, then, to the extent these data are
revealing, they comport well with this Article's characterization of the
Chevron lottery.
2. Deference in the Courts of Appeals.-This section turns to work on
deference practice in the courts of appeals. Scholarship in this area combines
quantitative and qualitative methods to shed light on how Skidmore is
applied.
For the purposes of this Article, the most valuable source on the circuit
courts is a study by Kristin Hickman and Matthew Krueger.12 5 The work
provides a helpful complement to the Eskridge-Baer and Razo-Eskridge
pieces. Its scope is narrower: it examines a smaller set of cases, those
applying Skidmore in circuit courts between summer 2001 and summer 2006,
106 in all.1 26 But if the dataset is smaller and the focus narrower, the work
provides a close, qualitative analysis. The authors read the cases to
characterize the nature of deference applied under Skidmore, and their study
is the first to examine in depth the analysis conducted in a large population of
Skidmore cases.1 27
The authors contrast two models of Skidmore analysis that are rooted in
the case law: a sliding-scale model, in which courts are sensitive to indicia of
agencies' reliability and fidelity, and an independent-judgment model that is
tantamount to de novo review.1 28 Their core finding is that, generally, the
circuit courts follow the sliding-scale model.12 9
123. Eskridge & Baer,supra note 6, at 1133.
124. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
125. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard,
107 COLUM. L. REv. 1235 (2007). Other important studies of the impact of Mead in the lower
courts include articles by Lisa Schultz Bressman and Adrian Vermeule. Both pieces show courts
struggling to find their way in the early aftermath of Mead. Writing in 2003, Vermeule reported
that "[iln the trenches of the D.C. Circuit, . . . Mead's ambitious recasting of deference law has gone
badly awry," as panels reached inconsistent, and in Vermeule's view, frequently mistaken, views of
what Mead required. Vermeule, supra note 10, at 349. Writing two years later, Bressman observed
courts dividing over whether to follow Mead or Barnhart. Bressman, supra note 5, at 1459. Note
that subsequent history suggests courts' enthusiasm for Barnhart to be a passing fancy: court of
appeals cases cited Barnharttwenty-eight times in 2003 alone, but only five to ten times annually in
recent years.
126. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 125, at 1259-60.
127. Id. at 1267.
128. Id. at 1252-59.
129. Id. at 1271.
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Hickman and Krueger's conclusions bolster this Article's
characterization of the Skidmore lottery as an environment in which the
probability of surviving judicial review is pegged to the plausibility of the
agency's interpretation. Hickman and Krueger find that courts applied
the sliding-scale approach to Skidmore in 79 of the 106 cases reviewed, and
the independent judgment model in only 20.130 They further find that, of the
factors named in Skidmore, the two given the most emphasis by reviewing
courts are the validity of the agency's reasoning and the thoroughness of its
consideration.13 ' Hickman and Krueger understand "validity" "to include
discussion of the reasonableness and plausibility of the interpretation
itself," 32 and note that in evaluating the "thoroughness of consideration,"
courts examine the quality of the justification proffered by the agency. 3 3
Courts give comparatively less weight to other "contextual" factors: the
formality of the agency's procedures,' 34 the consistency of the agency's
interpretation over time,' 3 5 and the agency's subject-specific expertise.
Putting this all together, when circuit courts apply Skidmore, they are
generally applying sliding-scale deference. And in applying sliding-scale
deference, they focus primarily on the content of the agency's interpretation,
and specifically, its apparent consistency with the statute. Other, contextual
factors that are independent of the interpretation's content-such as agency
expertise and formality of procedures-turn out to play a less prominent role
in Skidmore analysis than sometimes thought.'3 7 In other words, when courts
apply Skidmore review, the chance an interpretation will survive rises to the
extent that it is credible as a faithful construction of the statute.
To be sure, the stylized account this Article presents of how slidingscale deference works in the Skidmore lottery does not capture the full
complexity of Skidmore review in practice. No doubt in many instances,
statutory terms may be so open-ended that there is no way to say which
possible interpretation better keeps faith with the statute.138 In some cases,
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1281, 1285.
132. Id. at 1285.
133. Id. at 1281.
134. See id. at 1283 ("Courts assessed the formality of the administrative interpretation's
procedural pedigree and format with somewhat less frequency than other factors.").
135. See id. at 1286 ("[D]espite its numerous appearances in judicial opinions, 'consistency'
seems less dispositive than other Skidmore factors.").
136. See id. at 1288-89 ("[T]he expertise factor generally lacks teeth, as courts only counted
this factor against agency deference in three of the cases we evaluated.").
137. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations,Agency Expertise,
and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 737-39 (2002) (arguing for an
interpretation that emphasizes the importance of expertise).
138. Skidmore itself may have been such a case. Again, the question at issue was whether the
nights that firefighters spent on call at the plant counted as "working time" for purposes of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. The traditional tools of
statutory construction aided the Court little in determining which interpretation better comported
with the enacting Congress's intent.
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the answer may depend on what theory of statutory interpretation one
endorses.'3 9 But though this Article's account of the Skidmore lottery is a
simplification, it is a reasonable one. The Article's core contention is that,
all else equal, the more persuasive an agency's claim that an interpretation is
consistent with the statute, the better chance it will stand under Skidmore
review. And this is consistent with Krueger and Hickman's finding that
Skidmore is generally applied as a sliding-scale deference standard along the
lines discussed above. 140
A case such as Lopez v. Terrell14 1 illustrates how sliding-scale Skidmore
review works in practice. The case presented the question of whether a
federal prisoner accrues "Good Conduct Time" (GCT) for time spent in
federal and state custody before his federal sentencing.142 The applicable
statute provided that prisoners may receive "up to 54 days [GCT] at the end
of each year of the prisoner's term of imprisonment."l 4 3 In informal rulings,
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had interpreted the statutory language to permit
the accrual of GCT only for time spent in federal custody following
sentencing.144 Inmate Lopez had argued, and the district court had agreed,
that the statutory language permitted the accrual of GCT for all the time
spent in custody for his federal offense.145
The appellate court evaluated the BOP's interpretation under
Skidmore.'4 6 Rather than interpreting the contested language for itself, or
calibrating the deference owed the agency based on its expertise, the court
carefully considered the agency's case for its reading of the statute. BOP
made a tight textualist argument, arguing "that the phrase ['term of
imprisonment'] must be understood within the context of the statute as a
whole and, in particular, in reference to the word 'sentence' in the preceding
phrase, 'a prisoner ... may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner's
sentence."'1 4 7 The agency argued that the meaning of "sentence" was clearly
defined in federal law, showed where, and explained how that definition

139. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:

STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 689-846 (4th ed. 2007) (exploring intentionalist,

purposivist, and textualist approaches to statutory construction). The Supreme Court has described
the object of statutory interpretation as determining congressional intent, "[e]mploying traditional
tools of statutory construction." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987). This Article
need not-and does not-take a position in the rich theoretical debates over precisely what this
means. This is because, generally speaking, an interpretation of an ambiguous statute that satisfies
Skidmore will tend to be truer to the statute, by the lights of any plausible theory of statutory
interpretation, than an interpretation that fails to do so.
140. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
141. 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
142. Id. at 177.
143. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2006)).
144. Id. at 180.
145. Id.

146. Id. at 183.
147. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.

§ 3624(b)).
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foreclosed Lopez's interpretation. 48 Noting that it "aligns with traditional
canons of statutory interpretation," the court "[found] the BOP's construction
of [the statute] persuasive" under Skidmore.14 9
To sum up this subpart: empirical evidence gathered from both Supreme
Court and circuit court practice supports this Article's claim that agencies
facing judicial review of their statutory interpretations face a deference
lottery with specific features. Even for interpretations offered in notice-andcomment rulemakings and formal adjudications, where Mead suggests a
presumption of Chevron review, Eskridge and Baer's Supreme Court data
show that Skidmore is frequently applied instead.' 50 Moreover, the deference
regime applied in individual cases is not correlated with objective measures
of an interpretation's content,' 5' meaning that, from the agency's perspective,
the standard applied seems to be chosen as if through a random draw. This is
consistent with the Article's characterization of the Chevron lottery. When
Skidmore is applied, Hickman and Krueger's study of circuit courts shows
that panels are attentive to the plausibility of agencies' statutory
interpretation, more so than to content-independent contextual factors such as
agency expertise.15 2 This finding tracks my account of the Skidmore lottery,
in which agencies cannot ensure their survival under Skidmore review, but
can improve their chances by choosing an interpretation that is safer-that is,
more credibly faithful to the statute.
C.

Why a Deference Lottery?

This Part has established that agencies face a deference lottery when
they defend statutory interpretations in court. The ultimate object of this
Article is not to explain why agencies encounter a deference lottery, but to
explore how agencies would rationally respond to one.1 53 In other words, the
focus of this Article is squarely on the behavior of agencies in reaction to
deference lotteries, not the behavior of courts that gives rise to them. That
being said, this subpart very briefly explains why the existence of a deference
lottery is in fact consistent with some common-sensical suppositions about
judicial behavior. The subpart concludes with a simple illustration of how
the Skidmore lottery described in this Article can arise as the product of
individual judicial decisions.
The deference lottery concept implies that the outcomes we are
interested in-whether an agency gets Chevron or Skidmore deference (the

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
151. As noted above, there is an exception for notice-and-comment rulemakings prior to 2000,
where the probability of Chevron review is somewhat higher when interpretations are long-standing
or continuous. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 129-36.
153. See infra Part l1l.
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Chevron lottery) and whether or not, under Skidmore, the agency is upheld
(the Skidmore lottery)-are selected as if through random draws from given
probability distributions. For this to be so, it need not be the case that
individual judges are actually randomizing their decisions: flipping coins to
decide cases, as it were. Rather, so long as individual judges differ
sufficiently in how they apply the substantive standards, it is enough that the
assignment of judges to panels be random.' 4 The deference lottery is not an
attribute of the practice of any individual judge, but is instead an emergent
feature of the judicial system.' 55
Consider, for instance, the Chevron lottery that governs whether agency
statutory interpretations will be evaluated under Chevron or Skidmore. As a
matter of doctrine, this decision is governed by the Mead standard: did
Congress intend for the agency to speak to this issue with the force of law?
But as discussed,156 the Mead standard is so vague that we can expect
individual judges to differ over how liberally Chevron deference should be
granted under it. Assuming that judges vary in their disposition to apply
Chevron across a court, three-judge panels drawn at random from that court
will reach different conclusions. The probability that a randomly selected
panel will apply Chevron is a function of the distribution of views about
Chevron's scope in the pool of judges. The net effect is to randomize what
standard is applied, although no individual judge is randomizing.
A similar story explains the emergence of the Skidmore lottery. Under
Skidmore, an agency interpretation merits deference proportional to its
"power to persuade."' 5 7 This, too, is a vague standard, and judges may differ
on just how "persuasive" an agency interpretation must be to survive judicial
review under Skidmore. Depending on which judges are selected to hear a
case, a given interpretation may or may not pass muster. But the more
clearly faithful to the statute an interpretation is, the better chances it has of
surviving Skidmore review, because a larger number of possible panels may
deem it acceptable.
This point can be developed more formally. Suppose that the different
possible interpretations of a statute are laid out on a continuum, from the

154. On randomization in judicial assignment to appellate court panels, and divergences from
strict randomness, see Matthew Hall, Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial
Assignment in the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 574, 577-81 (2010).
Indeed, the assignment ofjudges need not even be random for judicial review to approximate
a lottery, so long as individual judges' views on how the standards apply in concrete cases are
sufficiently opaque from the agency's perspective. The Supreme Court, of course, hears its cases en
banc, and yet it is no easy feat predicting how the Court will apply its deference regime to particular
cases, as Eskridge and Baer show. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1136-53.
155. "Emergence" refers to the development of complex systems through the aggregation of
simple individual behaviors. See generally STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED
LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE (2001) (chronicling various systems displaying
emergent features).
156. See supra subpart II(A).
157. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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most defensible (i.e., most readily justified as faithful) to the most
adventurous. Imagine that each judge on a court has a "decision cutpoint"
falling somewhere along this line: in his view, no interpretations more
adventurous than this cutpoint are justifiable under Skidmore review.
Imagine that this court has ten judges, whose cutpoints are distributed as
shown in Figure 1. The point 0 on the axis denotes an interpretation so
extreme that no judge would approve it under Skidmore. Points 0.1 through
I each represent the cutpoint of one of the ten judges.

I
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I
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I
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0.8
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1

Figure 1: Distributionof Cutpoints.
A panel of three judges will be drawn at random from this court to
evaluate an agency's statutory interpretation. In the event that the court
applies Skidmore, how does the outcome of judicial review vary as a function
of which interpretation along this continuum it chooses? Figure 2 illustrates
the answer. The court's judgment varies probabilistically as a function of the
interpretation the agency chooses. Moving along the continuum from left to
right, the interpretation falls to the right side of more and more judges'
cutpoints, so that the chances rise of drawing a panel of three judges, of
whom two would approve it. The actual shape of the probability distribution
will depend on the distribution of judges' cutpoints along the line. 58
Obviously, this stylized representation greatly simplifies the actual practice
of deference and decision making on appellate courts.'15 But it suffices to
show that a deference lottery follows naturally from reasonable assumptions
about how multi-member courts operating in panels apply vague standards.

158. The calculations of the probabilities shown in the graph are on file with the author and
available upon request.
159. For a more detailed, formal treatment ofjudicial bargaining on three-judge courts, see Jud
Mathews, Opinion Competition and Judge Replacement on Collegial Courts (Ill. Program in Law,
Behavior, & Soc. Sci., Paper No. LBSS12-19, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868619.
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Figure 2: Skidmore Lottery as Aggregation ofJudges' Cutpoints.

Note that this account is entirely consistent with strategic behavior by
judges in pursuit of their own policy preferences.160 Individual judges may
be more disposed to defer to conservative rulings or liberal ones, and more or
less willing to stretch doctrine in pursuit of their preferences.' 6' This
framework can easily accommodate judges with policy preferences if we
suppose that judges' preferences reflect where their decision cutpoints lie in
individual cases. For the deference lottery to work, doctrine need only
provide at least a weak constraint on judicial action-preventing, for
instance, judges from having "backwards" cutpoints, so that more extreme
interpretations are less likely to be rejected. The other judges on a panel are
in a position to check, or at the very least, spotlight politically motivated
rulings that are sharply at odds with doctrine-for instance, rulings against

160. For empirical work supporting the thesis that judges manipulate review of agencies to
achieve favored results under hard look review, see Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real
World ofArbitrarinessReview, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (2008).
161. For the classic statement of the "attitudinal" model of judicial decision making, see
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 86-97 (2002).
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the agency when its interpretation is plainly justifiable under the Skidmore
formula.162
III. Playing the Deference Lottery
Having established the deference lottery's existence in the previous
Part, this Part considers its implications for agency behavior. In particular, it
investigates how different configurations of the deference regime's
component parts-the Chevron lottery and the Skidmore lottery, in the
parlance of this Article-might induce different kinds of statutory
interpretations on the part of agencies. The method for exploring these
dynamics come from the tool kit of Positive Political Theory (PPT): a simple,
decision-theoretic model of agency action. 163 This Part lays out the model
and highlights some of its key results. Part IV will consider what practical
implications this deductive exercise has for administrative law and courts'
deployment of deference doctrines.
As noted in Part I,164 this approach to the problem of deference is
strongly influenced by PA theory.165 From the perspective of this model,
agencies are regarded as agents-first and foremost, of the Congresses that
enacted the statutes they administer, or (more abstractly) of the statutes
themselves. When Congress charges an agency with administering a statute,
Congress intends the agency to carry out its statutory charge faithfully.
However, Congress's delegation of authority to the agency introduces slack
and creates the possibility for "agency losses"-for the agency to pursue its
own ends, rather than the principal's.'66 Statutory interpretation is one means
by which agencies can slant the administration of a statute to the service of
their own policy priorities. For instance, in the 1970s, the National Labor
Relations Board sought to broaden the definition of "employee" to include

162. See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the US. Courts
ofAppeals, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 421, 425-27 (2007) (discussing how dissents and the threat of
dissents can act as a constraint on majority rulings that stray too far from established doctrine).
163. The essence of PPT is to "treat[] policymaking as a game of strategy and focus[] on the
choices that rational actors make in pursuit of their goals." David S. Law, Introduction: Positive
Political Theory and the Law, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1 (2006). For a detailed survey of
PPT's contributions to the study of public law, see McNollGast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND EcoNoMics 1651 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).

164. See supra text accompanying note 24.
165. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST
POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 27-28 (1999); see also Mark

Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet, Theory and Practice ofDelegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions,
in THE POLITICS OF DELEGATION 1, 3-9 (Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2003) (laying
out the elements of PA theory).
166. See EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 165, at 29 (noting that agency loss occurs when
an agent generates outcomes at odds with the preferred interests of a principal).
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some supervisors, despite the Taft-Hartley Act's exclusion of managerial
employees from its scope.
Within this PA perspective, judicial review functions as a strategy to
monitor and discipline agency performance. More aggressive monitoring of
agencies by courts can reduce agencies' waywardness, by inducing them to
follow the statutes they administer more faithfully than they otherwise might.
The idea that judicial review can have this effect is commonplace in classic
administrative law theory,' 68 as well as in PA scholarship.169 However,
monitoring imposes costs of its own. In particular, aggressive judicial review
of agency interpretations translates into higher reversal rates: all else equal,
when courts review agencies more stringently, they will strike down agency
actions more frequently. 7 e Reversals of agencies are extremely costly, in
that they can send agencies back to the drawing board, wiping out years of
work formulating a policy, and disrupt expectations among those affected by
agency policy. 7 1
The PA account sketched here so far fails to account for a key player in
the administrative process: the President. Of course, as instrumentalities of
the Executive Branch, agencies are in an important sense also agents of the
President. The President is equipped with powerful tools for shaping and
monitoring agency performance, starting with the constitutional authority to
appoint agency officials,172 and including the power to review agency
agendas and policies on an ongoing basis through the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB).'7 3 "Common agency" problems-where a single agent

167. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 674, 678 (1980); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 270-71, 275 (1974). On the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, see
Marley S. Weiss, Kentucky River at the Intersection of Professional and Supervisory StatusFertile Delta or Bermuda Triangle?, in LABOR LAW STORIES 353, 363-64 (Laura J. Cooper &
Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005). For a discussion of contrary perspectives on the Taft-Hartley Act, see
Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with
Its Structure and Function and Suggestionsfor Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2034-35 (2009). For a
detailed account of changes in direction at two agencies over the course of three presidential
administrations, see RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY
CHANGE: A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES 3-8 (2d ed. 1996).
168. See LOUis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965)
(explaining the need for restrictions on agencies).
169. EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 165, at 25; Charles R. Shipan, The Legislative
Design ofJudicialReview: A FormalAnalysis, 12 J.THEORETICAL POL. 269, 269 (2000).
170. Of course, a key point of this Article is that all else is not equal: if agencies anticipate
more aggressive judicial review, they will adapt their interpretive practices strategically. But the net
effect will still be a rise in reversal rates.
171. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 87-100
(1990) (describing in detail the costs, in terms of wasted agency resources and reduced auto safety,
of judicial invalidations of vehicle safety standards).
172. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
173. See generally Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003) (analyzing the effects of White House review of
agency rules).
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has two or more principals-present their own dynamics,174 but the
President's role can also be accommodated more simply within the
framework outlined here. From the perspective of the enacting Congress, the
President can be regarded chiefly as a potential cause of agency losses. In
other words, the President exacerbates the agency problem vis-i-vis the
enacting Congress to the extent the agency is responsive to the President's
agenda at the expense of a faithful construction of the statute it is charged to
administer.' 75
That said, the President's responsibility "[to] take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed"' 76 does bear on the model in the following important
way. Focusing on the PA relationship between Congress and agency, as this
Article does, is not to deny that a presidential role in steering agency policy
making is appropriate or desirable. In fact, the thrust of much administrative
law scholarship over the past quarter century has been to emphasize the
benefits of active presidential management of agency decision making, not
least because this allows for more informed and responsive policies. 7 7
Accordingly, the Article does not assume that the socially optimal outcome is
the elimination of all agency slack, such that agencies should have no
interpretive leeway. Some measure of slack may best accommodate the
competing, legitimate claims of the Legislative and Executive Branches to
influence the content of statutory interpretation. This Article takes no
position on just how much interpretive leeway is best left to agencies, a
question that is impossible to answer with any sort of precision. Rather, this
Article shows that the deference lottery makes it possible for courts to elicit a
wider range of interpretive behaviors from agencies than would a Chevrononly regime. 17 In other words, the deference lottery is a more flexible tool
174. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Common Agency, 54 ECONOMETRICA
923, 923 (1986) (identifying and explaining the common agency problem).
175. See id. at 924 (explaining that common agency problems can arise when two different
government bodies oversee one agent).
176. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
177. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 173, at 821-24 (arguing for presidential review of agencies);
Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001) (discussing the
emergent role of presidential administrative control). For an overview of the presidential turn in
administrative law scholarship, see Kathryn A. Watts, Proposinga Placefor Politics in Arbitrary
and CapriciousReview, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 32-39 (2009).

Furthermore, as noted above, statutes are often sufficiently open-ended that there is no
discernible "congressional intent" on the issues that come before agencies, so that responsiveness to
the President need not come at the expense of fidelity to Congress. See Kagan, supra,at 2255-59
(reflecting on the practical extent of congressional oversight due to open-ended statutes).
Perhaps the most sustained and detailed empirical account of the systematic problems that
aggressive judicial review can cause in a sensitive policy domain remains Shep Melnick's study of
the Clean Air Act in the courts. R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF
THE CLEAN AIR ACT 343-93 (1983).
178. The deference lottery is also more flexible than a Skidmore-only regime, so long as the
inherent fuzziness of the scope-of-review language and the variation in how different judges would
apply any single sliding-scale review standard combine to make a Skidmore-only regime, where the
level of scrutiny applied is precisely calculated to produce a desired level of agency compliance, an
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for shaping agency behavior, subject to the caveats and qualifications
discussed below.
Agency Behavior and Lotteries
How do agencies decide what interpretation of a statute to advance in a
regulation? Treating agencies as unitary, rational actors,' 79 I assume that an
agency will choose the interpretation it believes to have the highest expected
value to the agency. 8 o What gives an interpretation value from an agency's
perspective? The model posits that agencies have policy preferences, which
may diverge from the aims encoded in the statutes that they administer. If
we imagine the spectrum of policy possibilities as a line segment, and the
agency's most preferred policy as a point on that line (the agency's "ideal
point"), I assume that, the closer a policy is to the agency's ideal point, the
more value it has to the agency.' 8
The agency's ideal point need not
coincide with the interpretation that is most faithful to statutory intent. I also
assume the agency wishes to avoid reversals by the reviewing court, and
considers a reversal-in which case no policy takes effect-to be at least as
bad as ending up with any point on the policy spectrum. For simplicity, we
can think of this outcome as having a value to the agency of zero.
These assumptions are, of course, simplifications. But I argue they are
reasonable first-cut approximations, suitable for this approach. Does it make
sense to consider agencies to be rational, in the sense that they respond
strategically to cues from courts? Close studies of agency decision making,
and first-hand accounts from participants, strongly suggest that agencies do
care about how their actions fare in the courts;182 that they seek to craft
agency actions to resist reversal; 8 3 and that they are aware, at least in broad
strokes, about what standards courts are applying.' 84 And while agencies are

A.

unrealistic option. See infra text accompanying note 217. The Article focuses on Chevron because,
for notice-and-comment rulemakings and formal adjudications, a Chevron-only regime seems to be
the main alternative on the table. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 240-41 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for Chevron when there is an authoritative agency interpretation).
179. See MCCARTY & MEIROWITZ, supra note 18, at 6-7 (defining rationality in game theory).
180. For a thorough discussion of subjective expected utility theory and the assumptions that
underlie it, see generally PAUL ANAND, FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER RISK (1993).

181. In the language of subjective utility theory, the agency's preferences are single-peaked
(i.e., the ideal point is the unique maximizer for the agency) and symmetric (i.e., deviations the
same distance from the ideal point to either side of it have the same value to the agency).
182. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 86, at 1047 (showing that in 40% of remand cases, rules
undergo "major changes").
183. See Mashaw, supra note 14, at 203 (describing the phenomenon of "defensive
rulemaking").
184. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
59-60 (1975). On the other hand, there is a good argument that we need not worry that introducing
the possibility of Chevron deference for informal agency interpretations that otherwise might merit
Skidmore deference will induce agencies to take greater license in interpreting the statutes. The
mass of such informal actions are taken on the lower rungs of agency hierarchies and tend to have
limited policy salience. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001)
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far from unitary-they are complex organizations whose component parts
pursue independent, and sometimes conflicting, agendas' 8 5-if the concern
about judicial reversal is shared within an agency, it can induce an agency to
act in a way that approximates a unitary, rational actor.' 86 Lastly, it is clear
that agencies may act on preferences different from those encoded in the
statutes they administer. Administrative law scholars and political scientists
have identified many cases where agencies push policies that strain against a
statutory frame, whether owing to "capture" by a set of powerful interests, 8 7
or issue-driven civil servants, or at the behest of an administration and its
political appointees.' 89
How does the agency select an interpretation? In the absence of judicial
review, the agency would simply pick its ideal point: the policy that
maximizes its benefit.' 90 With judicial review, however, the agency has to
make its selection with an eye to the rule's chances of making it past the
court.' 9' To put the point more formally, we can represent the expected value
(describing the 10,000 letter rulings issued by forty-six customs offices). There is little reason to
suppose that the front-line officials issuing such interpretations are closely attuned to judicial
doctrine, or that there would be a substantial difference in terms of the policy substance of their
output if they were.
185. For an insightful discussion of how administrative law doctrines empower different
constituencies within agencies, see Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within
Agencies, 120 YALELJ. 1032, 1079-81 (2011).
186. But see id.; MELNICK, supra note 177, at 302-03 (arguing that judicial scrutiny of the
Clean Air Act inflated lawyers' leverage over EPA rulemaking at the expense of agency engineers).
The unitariness assumption is, however, shared by other game theoretic works on agency decision
making. See Shipan, supra note 169, at 274-76 (representing the agency as a single actor in his
game-theoretic model of the legislative choice of judicial review). For a selection of influential
scholarship on the determinants of agency behavior, see PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 82-129 (2d ed. 2004).
187. See generally MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION (1955) (describing how the policies of the Interstate Commerce Commission at that
time were dominated by railroad industry interests so that the agency no longer effectively regulated
other transportation industries).
188. For a historical perspective, see, for example, DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 131-35 (2001) (describing how a "mezzo-level" manager within the
Post Office Department was integral in getting a hesitant Congress to enact permanent authority for
Rural Free Delivery).
189. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Scientific Integrity: The Perils and Promise of White House
Administration, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 2395, 2406 (2011) (illustrating Executive control over
scientific information with reference to the Bush-era NASA policy of requiring all scientists' press
appearances to be first cleared with the agency's public affairs office).
190. In reality, an agency would also need to steer clear of interpretations so unpalatable to the
current Congress that they would elicit a statutory override, or other forms of congressional
discipline. See EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 165, at 24-25 (describing direct and indirect
methods of congressional discipline, including curtailing agency budgets).
191. Yehonatan Givati raises an intriguing possibility not explored here: that an agency might
be able to choose an interpretation palatable enough to the interested parties to avoid a court
challenge, and thereby short-circuit judicial review. Yehonatan Givati, Strategic Statutory
Interpretation by Administrative Agencies, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 95, 96 (2010). While this
might be possible in some instances, it would probably be rare, at least with respect to important
policy issues, that an agency interpretation would satisfy all potential challengers. Indeed, previous
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to an agency of advancing interpretation x as p * ua(x), where p is the
probability that x will survive judicial review, and ua(x) is the utility to the
agency of having interpretation x become law.' 92
As I have argued, the probability that the agency's interpretation
survives review-p, in the expression above---depends on both the Chevron
lottery and the Skidmore lottery, and we can rewrite the expression above to
take account of how each introduces unpredictability of a particular sort. I
use pc to represent the ex ante probability that an interpretation will receive
Chevron review. I initially make (and later relax) the assumption that if an
agency gets Chevron, it is home free: that the agency's interpretation will be
upheld.' 93 Consistent with the characterization of the Chevron lottery above,
I also assume that pc is independent of the content of the agency's
interpretation: that the agency cannot game the odds of getting Chevron
deference in a predictable way by manipulating the content of its rule.194
This, then, is one "lever" the courts have over the deference lottery: how
strong is the default norm that statutory interpretations are afforded Chevron
review?
The probability that the interpretation survives sliding-scale Skidmore
review is given by ps(x). In contrast to pc, p,(x) depends on the content of the

interpretation the agency offers: in other words, it is a function of x, which is
why ps(x) is written, instead of just ps. The model posits that the closer the
agency's interpretation is to the "best" reading of the statute-the one that
can most persuasively be argued to be consistent with the statute-the greater
the probability it will survive Skidmore review. The crucial question about
the Skidmore lottery is: do incremental shifts in the agency's interpretation
shift the odds modestly or dramatically? Is Skidmore fairly deferential, in
which case fairly adventurous readings of the statute stand a solid chance of
work has found that 85% of the EPA's nonroutine rules, along with every new health standard
issued by OSHA has been challenged in court. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 246 (2d ed. 1999). However, the
frequency of rulemaking challenges likely varies by subject matter. See Wendy Wagner, Revisiting
the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1717, 1717 (2012) (concluding that the EPA's air toxic emissions rules are only
rarely challenged in court).
192. We could also write the expected utility as p * ua(x) + (1 - p) * ua(0), where the second
term is the probability the interpretation does not survive review ((1 -p)) times the agency's utility
from that outcome (u,(0)), but the value of this term is zero, since I have stipulated that ua(0) = 0.
193. Of course, agencies do not always win under Chevron. Still, agency interpretations stand
good odds of being upheld when courts apply Chevron. As noted above, agencies go on to win in
78% of the cases in which the Supreme Court determines the Chevron framework applies. See
supra note 106; see also Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the
Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (1998) (finding that
agencies win 89% of the time when courts reach the "reasonableness" prong of the Chevron test).
194. As noted above, the one significant exception to this assumption suggested by the
Supreme Court data is that the Supreme Court is significantly more likely to afford Chevron
deference to consistent, rather than novel, agency interpretations. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at
1133. But as also noted above, this regularity appears to have diminished over time. See supra
notes 115 -16 and accompanying text.
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surviving review, or is it quite strict, so that agencies must hew quite close to
the "best" reading to enjoy good odds? To put the point differently, if we
think about increasing the odds under judicial review as buying "insurance"
for the agencies against the risk of reversal, how expensive is the insurance
in policy terms?' 95
The figure below illustrates the issue graphically, in a simplified form.
The x-axis denotes possible interpretations of the statute, with point x = 1
indicating the one that can be most persuasively justified. The point x = 0
represents an interpretation of the statute so adventurous that it stands no
chance of surviving review under any of these standards.
On the y-axis is the agency's probability of surviving Skidmore review.
The three curves on the graph represent three possible modes of Skidmore
analysis. The dashed line depicts a strict Skidmore, where movement along
the x-axis towards I is rewarded grudgingly, with small improvements in the
probability of survival; the dotted line represents a lax Skidmore, and the
solid line, a middle-of-the-road approach.196 As noted above,' 97 there has
been a long-running debate about just what level of scrutiny Skidmore
entails, with different courts choosing among these different approaches.19 8

195. Peter Strauss's characterization of deference doctrine in terms of "Chevron space" and
"Skidmore weight" identifies the same salient distinctions between the two regimes as my deference
lottery concept. Chevron creates a zone in which agencies have the discretion to set policy
themselves, whereas Skidmore instructs courts how much credence to give agency views in their
own resolution of statutory questions. Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call
Them "Chevron Space "and "Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1143, 1143 (2012).
196. Note that there are many other ways these curves could be drawn; the Article's only
assumption is that the function is "increasing in x": in other words, that the probability of surviving
Skidmore review goes up as the interpretation nears x = I (i.e., grows safer).
197. See supranotes 125-29 and accompanying text.
198. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 125, at 1267-71 (highlighting several cases that
illustrate how different courts of appeals have chosen different approaches to Skidmore deferencethe independent judgment and sliding-scale models).
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Figure3: Three Variants of Skidmore Review.

Putting the pieces of the deference lottery together gives us the agency's
optimization problem. The agency will select the interpretation that yields
the highest expected value in light of the deference lottery-in light of the
chances that it will receive sliding-scale deference instead of Chevron, and
that it will not survive that scrutiny. Mathematically, this means choosing
the value of x that maximizes this expression:

PC * ua(x) + (1 - PC) *PsAX) * ua.x)
This is the probability of receiving Chevron review (pc,), times the
benefit to the agency from interpretation x (ua,(x)), plus the probability of
receiving Skidmore review (1 - PC), times the probability that interpretation x
would survive Skidmore (p,(x)), times the benefit to the agency frorn
interpretation x (ua,(x)).
B.

Results

What can be said about how the deference lottery can shape agency
behavior and policy outcomes in this stylized model? Of course, specific
results would depend on the particulars of how an agency's utility function
and preferences are defined, matters on which this Article takes no
position.199 Although the Article does not work through the agency's
optimization problem formally, this subpart highlights three general results,
all of which can be explained informally.

199. The results can hold whether the agency is risk neutral or risk averse, but they are more
pronounced if the agency is risk averse.
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1. Increasing the Stringency of Skidmore Review Constrains Agency
Opportunism-Up to a Point.-The first observation is important, and
straightforward. Relative to a Chevron-only deference regime, introducing
the possibility that agencies' interpretations may be selected, as if at random,
to face higher scrutiny can constrain agency opportunism. The chance of
receiving more stringent review gives agencies an incentive to "play it safer"
when interpreting statutes than they otherwise might. The mechanism comes
straight from the logic of PA theory: more aggressive monitoring of agent
behavior can reduce agency slack.20 0 What is perhaps most noteworthy about
the deference lottery is how it increases the flexibility of judicial review as a
tool for managing agency behavior, relative to an across-the-board Chevron
standard. As noted above, this Article takes no position on what is the
optimal amount of agency interpretive leeway. What is notable about the
deference lottery is that it can be used to incentivize different amounts of
agency leeway, depending on how high the probability of getting Skidmore is
and how much scrutiny Skidmore entails.2 0 1 To put the point more
technically, the model can yield different equilibria, depending on how the
lottery is configured. This means that the deference lottery is a sensitive
instrument for regulating agency conduct. Unless the desired level of agency
leeway is the maximum afforded under Chevron, the unpredictability of the
Mead regime, long derided as a bug, may in fact be a feature.
That being said, the model also shows that a poorly designed deference
lottery can backfire. In particular, ratcheting up the scrutiny under Skidmore
too far can have the counterintuitive-and undesirable--effect of
encouraging more, rather than less, agency opportunism. One might suppose
that increasing the stringency of review under Skidmore-that is, decreasing
the deference owed to agency constructions-would always induce agencies
to "play it safer" when interpreting statutes. And if Skidmore sliding-scale
review were the only standard in play, then this would be the result.
But matters become more complicated, and more interesting, if agencies
do not know ex ante whether they will be subject to Chevron review or to
Skidmore. When Chevron is a possibility, increasing the stringency of
Skidmore review past a certain point may cause a rational agency to
promulgate its most preferred interpretation, rather than one calculated to win
over the court with its fidelity to the statute. In technical terms, we can say
that the stringency of Skidmore review has a "nonmonotonic" relationship to
agency costs. 202 In plainer language, judicial scrutiny can backfire, leading
an agency to abandon its efforts to satisfy a demanding court.
200. See EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 165, at 27-28 (discussing PA models of
oversight).
201. See supra subpart Ill(A).
202. Depending on how the agency's utility function and the Skidmore lottery are defined, it is
possible that agency may shift its interpretation towards its ideal point gradually as Skidmore
scrutiny increases, rather than all at once after some "tipping point" ofSkidmore scrutiny has been
reached.
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It is not difficult to understand why this is so. Start by imagining a
deference regime in which an agency is guaranteed Chevron review for its
regulation. Assuming-as we do to start-that the agency's most preferred
interpretation would reliably be deemed "reasonable," even if it is not the
most natural reading of the statute, the agency's strategy is clear: it will
choose that most preferred interpretation. Now imagine that the agency faces
a Chevron lottery: the agency has some probability of receiving Chevron and
some probability of facing sliding-scale Skidmore review. The agency's
strategy, as before, will be to choose the interpretation that yields the highest
expected benefit to the agency. Now, however, the agency's best move in
many instances will be to hedge: to pick a somewhat safer interpretation that
stands a good chance of surviving Skidmore review, in the event that
Skidmore is applied, but whose policy content is still satisfactory to the
agency. This is the effect we want judicial review to have from a PA
perspective: it induces changes in agency behavior to mitigate agency losses
without generating wide-scale judicial reversals.
Imagine now the same scenario, except that the Skidmore standard is
more strict. In other words, the "insurance" against judicial reversal in the
event of Skidmore review has become more expensive in policy content
terms: the agency must hew closer to the safest interpretation to enjoy the
same probability in surviving review. At a certain point, however, the game
is no longer worth the candle: the agency has a higher expected payoff from
sticking with its most preferred interpretation and hoping for Chevron, rather
than making the policy compromises needed to gain good odds of satisfying
Skidmore. This is a bad outcome on any measure: the agency's behavior is
the same as we would see in a Chevron-only regime, but the level of judicial
reversals is higher, because the court is applying Skidmore some of the time.
A concrete example helps to illustrate the point. Imagine an agency is
choosing between three different possible interpretations of a statute: A, B,
and C, with its preferences in that order. More specifically, let's stipulate
that the agency gets a benefit of 100 if interpretation A becomes law, 80 if B
becomes law, and 60 if C becomes law.
Suppose that all of the
interpretations are sufficiently reasonable to withstand Chevron if it is
applied, but that the interpretations have different probabilities of being
approved by a court applying sliding-scale Skidmore deference. We can
further imagine two hypothetical Skidmore regimes, one that is relatively lax
and another that is relatively strict, with the probabilities for surviving review
being higher for any given interpretation under the former regime than the
latter regime. Specifically, imagine that the probabilities of survival in the
event Skidmore is applied are given by the following table:
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Interpretation A

Interpretation B

Interpretation C

Lax Skidmore

20%

65%

95%

Strict Skidmore

15%

30%

70%

Finally, suppose that in the Chevron lottery, the ex ante probability of
receiving Chevron deference is 60%. Which interpretation does it make
sense for the agency to select?
In a world where the Skidmore standard applied by courts is lax, the
agency's best option is to choose Interpretation B: the middle-of-the-road
interpretation that is neither the safest nor the most adventurous. 203
Interpretation B, while not the agency's favorite, is still acceptable to the
agency, and it stands a solid chance of being upheld even if Skidmore is
applied.
On the other hand, if the court applies the stricter version of Skidmore,
the agency's calculations change: now the best strategy is to choose
Interpretation A and hope for Chevron deference.2 04 The agency must
sacrifice so much in policy content to bring its odds of surviving Skidmore
review above 50% that it makes sense to opt out of the Skidmore lottery and
wager everything on winning the Chevron lottery. Note that this outcome is
plainly unsatisfactory: tightening the screws of Skidmore has ironically
yielded an agency interpretation less faithful to the statutory scheme and also
spiked the rate of judicial reversals.205
This finding introduces a cautionary note to judicial deference practice.
Ratcheting up the scrutiny of Skidmore could backfire badly if agencies stand
a good chance of drawing Chevron deference instead. How much scrutiny is
too much will depend on the particulars of agency preferences and the
Chevron and Skidmore lotteries; the following section explores the relations
between some of these factors.
2. The Chevron Lottery and the Skidmore Lottery Can Interact to
Shape Agency Behavior in Surprising Ways.-What can be said about how

the Chevron and Skidmore lotteries interact? One might suppose that they
are substitutes: that "tightening" the Chevron lottery-raising the odds that
an agency will face sliding-scale scrutiny-and "tightening" the Skidmore
203. The agency's expected benefit from choosing Interpretation B is 68.8: 0.6 * 80 + 0.4 *
0.65 * 80. That is the probability of receiving Chevron review (0.6) times the benefit to the agency
from Interpretation B (80), plus the probability of receiving Skidmore review (0.4) times the
probability of surviving that review (0.65) times the benefit to the agency from Interpretation B
(80).
This compares favorably to the expected benefit from Interpretation A (68) and
Interpretation C (58.8).
204. Interpretation A yields an expected benefit of 66. This exceeds the expected benefit from
Interpretation B (57.6) or Interpretation C (52.8).
205. We would expect courts to reverse agencies 34% of the time: Skidmore will be applied
40% of the time, and the agency will lose 85% of those cases.
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lottery-raising the odds an opportunistic interpretation will fail Skidmore
review-might be equally effective in inducing greater agency compliance.
In fact, it is not possible to make many specific claims about how the
Chevron and Skidmore lotteries interact without knowing more about the
agency's utility function and the shape of the Skidmore lottery's probability
distribution. These are all abstractions, of course, and the fine-grained
distinctions that are possible to draw with a mathematical model translate
only roughly, at best, to the messier, real-world environment of agencies and
courts.
Certainly when agencies choose among different possible
interpretations, they do not do so by undertaking subjective expected utility
calculations with hard numbers.206 All that being said, it is still worth noting
that the Chevron and Skidmore lotteries interact to shape agency incentives in
sometimes counterintuitive ways, and this favors some strategies of judicial
review over others.
In particular, it would seem reasonable at first blush to suppose that a
strict Chevron lottery and a strict Skidmore lottery might be effective
substitutes in inducing agency compliance. That is, we might expect that a
low probability of getting more aggressive review under Skidmore could
induce the same measure of agency compliance as a higher probability of
getting a somewhat lower measure of Skidmore scrutiny. In other words, if
Skidmore is applied quite stringently whenever it is applied, it could be used
more sparingly and still induce a desired level of agency compliance.
In fact, the "substitutability" of Chevron and Skidmore lotteries is not
reliable. Making it more likely that agencies will receive Chevron does
create more agency slack, but tightening up the Skidmore scrutiny will not
always reduce it. First, recall from above that if Skidmore review is too
strict, it makes sense for agencies to give up on trying to satisfy it. As a
result, ratcheting up Skidmore scrutiny to compensate for a looser Chevron
lottery will backfire if Skidmore is pushed past its threshold of effectiveness.
Secondly, the interactive effect depends on how adjustments to the intensity
of Skidmore scrutiny affect the probability of surviving judicial review.
Indeed, it is even possible that decreasingthe intensity of Skidmore review
may induce more agency compliance.20 7
The broader lesson here is that aggressive review under Skidmore is a
fairly blunt tool for shaping agency behavior. Ratcheting up the intensity of
Skidmore review may not reliably rein in agencies, because the incentives
generated by the interaction of the Chevron and Skidmore lotteries vary
widely based on the particulars of the situation. On the other hand,

206. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1091 (concluding that "there is no clear guide as to
when the Court will invoke particular deference regimes, and why").
207. This may be the case if the bump upwards in probability of surviving review is greater the
closer the agency's interpretation is to the most plausibly faithful interpretation. This kind of
manipulation to the Skidmore lottery weakens the "stick" (the penalty for opportunistic behavior)
but strengthens the "carrot" (the reward for compliant behavior).
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tightening up the Chevron lottery-that is, making it more likely that
agencies will be reviewed under Skidmore-will reliably incentivize more
compliance from agencies. Taken together, these findings suggest that a
moderate intensity Skidmore, applied with more frequency, might be a more
useful approach to managing agency behavior than very strict Skidmore
applied sparingly.
This result lines up with arguments, both prescriptive and descriptive,
made by other administrative law scholars. Eskridge and Baer call for an
overall streamlining of deference doctrine, for smoothing some of the sharp
discontinuities between different standards of review in favor of a continuum
of deference. 208 A deference lottery that liberally features a moderate,
sliding-scale Skidmore review, while not something that Eskridge and Baer
endorse, enjoys some similarities to their vision. 20 9 Also, David Zaring has
made the descriptive claim that the welter of different judicial review
doctrines that courts apply to agencies reduce to a single "reasonableness"
standard.2 10 This Article does not come to the same conclusion. But to the
extent that the deference lottery alternates Chevron deference with a
moderate intensity Skidmore standard applied fairly frequently, the result
would be approximately the same.
3. An Unpredictable Chevron Regime Attenuates Chevron's Capacity
to Shape Agency Behavior and Leads to More Judicial Reversals.-To this
point, the analysis has proceeded on the assumption that, if an agency
receives Chevron review, it is home free: its interpretation will be upheld as a
reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute. Of course, in reality,
agencies cannot count on surviving Chevron review.211 This section relaxes
the assumption and asks how the outcomes change if Chevron does not
always translate into an agency win. Specifically, this section considers the
effect of introducing some random variation into the outcome of Chevron
review. The consequence is unwelcome: Chevron's power to shape agency
behavior goes down, and the rate of judicial reversals goes up. So whereas
random assignment to different deference standards can be part of an
effective regime for managing agency behavior, random variation in
judgment worsens outcomes on any measure.
There is some empirical evidence that once agencies make it past
Chevron Step One-the question of whether the statute is ambiguous-they
are, if not guaranteed to win on Step Two, extremely likely to do so. A study
by Orin Kerr finds that, under Chevron Step Two, agency interpretations are
208. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1183-85.
209. There are significant differences as well: for instance, Eskridge and Baer make suggestions
for reducing the unpredictability of Chevron's application, and pegging Skidmore deference
squarely to agency expertise, rather than interpretive content. See id. at 1092-93.
210. Zaring, supra note 97, at 137.
211. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481-85 (2001) (rejecting
agency interpretation at Chevron Step Two).
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upheld 89% of the time.212 Imagine, though, that courts applying Chevron
Step One frequently decide that statutes unambiguously foreclose the
agency's interpretation, and that these decisions are not predictable. 213 We
can call this situation "Crapshoot Chevron." What will be the effect on
agency behavior?
The results are straightforward. As the predictability of Chevron Step
One declines, the Chevron lottery's capacity to shape agency behavior
attenuates. The more the Chevron lottery dissolves into noise, the more a
rational agency will key its behavior off the Skidmore lottery. Crapshoot
Chevron can thus have the same effect on agency behavior as increasing the
chance of receiving Skidmore review-namely, reining in agency
interpretations-but with one critical difference: the rate of judicial reversals
will rise.214 To the extent that courts rule against agencies in an
unpredictable way, judicial review loses its capacity to guide agency
behavior and imposes additional costs in the form of reversals. 215 Any level
of agency compliance achieved with Crapshoot Chevron could also be
achieved under a deference lottery with a fully predictable Chevron and at a
lower rate ofjudicial reversals.
Inevitably, there is a certain amount of noise in most doctrinal
frameworks, owing to the inherent vagueness of legal standards. Chevron
analysis, the key operative concepts of which are "ambiguous" and
"reasonable," will never be fully determinate or perfectly predictable. But
from the perspective of the operation of the deference lottery, it is best to
hold the apparent randomness of Chevron applications to a bare minimum.
A strong default norm for the Chevron framework of deciding close
questions in the agency's favor might seem to give agencies too much
latitude. But in the context of a deference lottery, such a norm supports an
effective regime for guiding agency behavior.

212. Kerr, supra note 193, at 31; cf Hickman & Krueger, supra note 125, at 1252 (remarking
that "it is unsurprising that most agency interpretations survive Chevron's second step" given that
"Chevron's step two nears the fully deferential end of the spectrum").
213. Judges and justices differ in their willingness to grant or refuse deference at Chevron Step
One. Justice Scalia, for instance, is less inclined to find ambiguity than most of his colleagues. See,
e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the regulation's interpretation runs afoul of the "unmistakably clear"
statute).
214. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 125, at 1278 (offering "support for the widely shared
belief that Skidmore is less deferential than Chevron").
215. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 486 (reversing in part after rejecting the agency's
interpretation).
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IV. Conclusion
A.

Assessment

This Article has argued that it makes sense to characterize courts'
practice of deference to agency statutory interpretations as a lottery with
particular features. The Supreme Court's Mead ruling offers no clear rule to
govern when courts will grant Chevron deference. In the event that Chevron
deference is not forthcoming, Skidmore offers the agency no guarantee of
survival, but the better the agency can justify its interpretation as consistent
with the content of the statute, the better its chances. Part II draws on
empirical work to confirm that this characterization of the doctrinal
framework is consistent with courts' actual deference practice. That Part
first establishes that the most extensive data collected have very little power
to predict when a given agency's regulation will receive Chevron deference.
Second, it establishes that in the circuit courts, Skidmore deference is best
understood in probabilistic terms, where the agency worsens its odds by
choosing constructions that cannot be easily justified with reference to the
content of the statute. Part III explores what taking the deference lottery
seriously means for how judicial review practices shape agency behavior.
The most striking result is that, relative to an all-Chevron regime, introducing
some chance of getting Skidmore review at random can curb agency
opportunism-with the important caveat that, if Skidmore is too hard to
satisfy, it may cease to affect agency behavior altogether, and instead simply
result in a higher rate of judicial reversals.
It is not possible, even within the terms of the model described in
Part III, to define the optimal configuration of the deference lottery-the
ideal mix of Chevron and Skidmore review, and the ideal level of stringency
within Skidmore. What is "optimal" depends on what level of agency
autonomy in statutory interpretation is the goal, and how costly judicial
reversals are thought to be-questions impossible to answer in the abstract.
But what the exploration of the workings of the deference lottery suggests is
that, if there is some value to curbing agency slack, a deference lottery is not
necessarily a bad approach. The Supreme Court's Mead decision, which lays
down a somewhat vague standard for whether Chevron or Skidmore applies,
has been roundly criticized.216 This work shows that Mead's vagueness may
have hidden virtues. Facing some possibility that they may encounter a
standard of scrutiny higher than Chevron may induce agencies to take more
care in using statutory interpretation to pursue their own goals. When
agencies are risk-averse, the effect on their behavior will be stronger still.
This is not to say, however, that if the courts were building a deference
regime from scratch, a deference lottery would be the best approach to take.
If the goal is to achieve a given level of agency compliance with as few

216. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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judicial reversals as possible, applying a uniform standard of properly
calibrated scrutiny would be the best approach. But of course courts are not
building a deference regime from scratch; they are working within an
existing matrix of precedents. If the baseline norm is that Chevron applies
whenever agencies interpret statutes in regulations and formal adjudications,
as some assumed before Mead, the more relevant question is, what effect
would it have to introduce the possibility that, sometimes, more scrutiny
might be applied? At least in terms of the simple model, the answer is that it
may cause agencies to stay closer to the statutory core without causing the
reversal rate to spike.
It is also worth noting that the residual, unavoidable unpredictability of
judicial standards of review may make the first-best solution-a uniform
standard of review, "correctly" calibrated to produce a desired level of
agency compliance-a difficult thing to craft. Just to state the goal is to
show how elusive its attainment would be. Even if there were agreement in
principle as to how much running room agencies should have in construing
statutes, what verbal formula would properly express it? And how would it
be possible to have a single standard be applied uniformly by the whole
appellate bench, particularly given that judges may have preferences over
policy and may apply the standard strategically in pursuit of those
A deference lottery acknowledges the irreducible
preferences?
indeterminacy of legal standards and the diversity of the bench, and
leverages both of these to produce a regime that can flexibly manage agency
behavior. If no single deference formula can reliably find the "sweet spot" of
agency autonomy in statutory interpretation, alternation between two
different standards, each in the proper proportion, may nudge agencies
towards it. The deference lottery is a second-best solution. But we live in
the world of the second best, and it may be hard to improve on a deference
lottery here.217
Two real-world questions naturally arise. The first is, how strict or lax
are the deference lotteries being imposed by our courts? The second is, do
the lotteries in fact have an effect on the content of agencies' statutory
interpretation? I can offer some preliminary thoughts on both questions,
although a complete answer to either is well beyond the scope of this Article.
A thorough assessment of the characteristics of the deference lotteries
imposed by our courts would require the collection and analysis of new data,

217. Another solution that would be effective in principle but difficult to implement in
practice-and would also raise troubling questions from a transparency in governance
perspective-is to create an "acoustic separation" between how courts review agencies and how
agencies think courts review agencies. In other words, if the deference regime were in fact quite
deferential, but agencies anticipated fairly stringent judicial review, the regime could generate the
benefits of agency compliance without the costs of high levels of reversals. Cf Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REV.
625, 625, 630 (1984) (defining "acoustic separation" as an imaginary situation in which only
officials know the rules for making decisions and only the public knows the conduct rules).
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but I can venture some observations based on the data already discussed in
this Article. On the whole, it seems that our deference lottery regime pairs a
fairly strict Chevron lottery with a fairly lax Skidmore lottery. In other
words, the chance that an agency will get Skidmore review is relatively high,
and its chances of surviving Skidmore review is also relatively high. The
Eskridge and Baer data show that, in the Supreme Court at least, agency
statutory interpretations in notice-and comment regulations are reviewed
either under Skidmore or what they term "Skidmore-light" approximately
30% of the time.2 8 (To the extent that appeals courts do as the Supreme
Court says and not as it does, however, the rate at which Skidmore is applied
could be somewhat lower.) 21 9 And the Hickman and Krueger work shows
that, when the courts of appeals do apply Skidmore, they pay careful
attention to the justifications offered by agencies, rather than interpreting
statutes de novo. 220 The Hickman and Krueger data show that the survival
rate for statutory interpretations under Skidmore is just over 60%, which
From the
suggests that the review is not extraordinarily stringent.22
information available, then, it seems that the deference lottery avoids the
combination of extremes-Skidmore applied harshly and infrequently-that
would cause reversals to mount without reducing agency slack.
But do agencies actually respond to deference lotteries as the theory
predicts? This question falls outside the scope of this Article, which is
fundamentally a theory-building piece. A thorough empirical analysis would
require either in-depth case studies of agency decision making or a largescale quantitative analysis of the content of agency statutory interpretations,
both of which present formidable challenges of data collection and
measurement.
That being said, the agency behaviors I posit here are plausible, based
on what we already know about how agencies operate. We know that
agencies' leaders do care how their actions fare in courts, and that agencies
make choices with an eye to surviving judicial review. Indeed, the
prominent scholarship from the 1980s and 1990s on the "ossification" of
rulemaking demonstrates that agencies respond strategically to cues from the
judiciary. That body of work demonstrates in detail how intensive judicial

218. See supra text accompanying note 104.
219. As discussed above, the language of Mead suggests a strong presumption that Chevron
will apply to statutory interpretations announced in notice-and-comment rulemakings and formal
adjudications. See supra notes 70-71.
220. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 125, at 1247 (stating that the Skidmore deference
standard requires "reviewing courts to evaluate an interpretation's persuasiveness by weighing
various factors").
221, Id. at 1275. Note, however, that the population of cases in the Hickman and Krueger
dataset includes all statutory interpretations, not only those promulgated through notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication. Since the default standard for agency statutory
interpretations promulgated through informal means is Skidmore, it may be that agencies are more
conservative with these interpretations, pushing the survival rate up.
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scrutiny of rulemaking2 22 can cause agencies either to forego rulemaking in
favor of other forms of activity, 22 3 or else to invest in additional procedureS224
or explanation 2 2 5 in order to pad out the record for judicial review.
Moreover, we know that the General Counsel's Office, which presumably
keeps abreast of developments in judicial review of agencies, is involved in
major policy initiatives from the earliest stages, at least in some large
agencies.2 26 For the model to reflect actual agency practice, all that needs to
happen is that personnel within agencies are broadly aware of reviewing
courts' recent deference practices with respect to the agency-do they grant
Chevron review frequently, and if not, how stringent does review tend to
be?-and that they bring this knowledge to bear when policy is made. And it
seems that changes in judicial deference practices do, in fact, induce changes
in how agencies interpret statutes, at least some of the time. Donald Elliott, a
former General Counsel for EPA, reports that "[EPA] and other agencies
gradually internalized and adapted to the additional interpretive discretion
(i.e., the expanded power) that Chevron provided them. Accordingly, EPA
and other agencies are now more adventurous when interpreting and
elaborating statutory law." 227

222. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Tvo Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the
District ofColumbia Circuit and JudicialDeterrence ofRulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 300-01
(remarking that "policymaking through agency rulemaking has declined significantly at some
agencies during the past decade," in large part because of "the approach taken by appellate courts
when they review agency rules").
223. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 171, at 95, 148-49 (describing how the National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration abandoned rulemaking in favor of vehicle recalls as
a tool for enhancing public safety, in large part due to the inhospitable reception of its rules by the
circuit courts).
224. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1410-26 (1992) (describing how agencies hold additional hearings, convene
panels of outside experts, and undertake studies to anticipate judicial challenges to rulemakings).
225. See Mashaw, supra note 14, at 196, 197 n.38 (noting the rapid growth, between the 1970s
and 1990s, in the length of the "concise statement[s] of basis and purpose" that the Administrative
Procedure Act requires agencies to file in connection with rulemakings).
226. See Magill & Venneule, supra note 185, at 1079-80 (observing how doctrines that extend
the scope ofjudicial review increase the leverage of lawyers over agency policy-making processes);
see also Thomas 0. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 57, 63-90 (providing an extensive overview of the EPA's internal
decision-making process, including the role of agency lawyers); id. at 67 ("[Office of General
Counsel's] duty to ensure that rules survive 'arbitrary and capricious' review justifies the office in
taking positions on the substantive merits of proposals and on the technical and economic validity
of the support documents.").
227. E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of
Congress, Courts and Agencies in EnvironmentalLaw, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (footnotes
omitted). That said, the impact of changes in judicial doctrine on agency behavior should not be
overstated. Several years earlier, Elliott himself was quoted saying, "I would take issue with the
assertion that we know that the effects of judicial review on the administrative process and on the
internal deliberations within agencies are huge." Administrative Law Symposium: Question &
Answer with Professors Elliott, Strauss, and Sunstein, 1989 DUKE L.J. 551, 553.
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Recommendations

Still, it is possible to offer some recommendations for some tweaks to
courts' practice that can improve the performance of the deference lottery,
whatever level of latitude is ideal for agencies to have. When making
recommendations, it is important to bear in mind that no single individual or
entity is in charge of defining the contours of the deference lottery; rather, it
is a phenomenon that emerges from the interactions of independent decisions
made by multiple judges, and indeed depends on judges having different
patterns of behavior. All that being said, the Supreme Court plays a critical
role in setting out the argumentation frameworks that shape how all federal
courts tackle legal questions.228 And there are two subtle changes to the
Supreme Court's deference doctrines that would make the deference doctrine
more effective at directing agency behavior, by bringing actual practice more
in line with the assumptions made in my model.
The first would be to reinforce the "sliding-scale" variant of Skidmore
analysis, which best encourages agencies to strive for interpretive fidelity to
the statutes they administer. As discussed above,229 close study of the
appellate courts has identified two major strains of Skidmore analysis, the
sliding-scale model and the independent-judgment model. The sliding-scale
model better rewards agents for more justifiable readings of the statutes they
administer. Under sliding-scale review, the agency's interpretation, rather
than the text of the statute, is the starting point for the court's analysis, and it
will stand or fall depending on how convincing a case the agency can make
for it. Even if an interpretation is not the one the court would have chosen ab
initio, the court is open to the agency's reasons for its choice and will credit
those reasons proportional to their power to persuade. This form of analysis
trains the reviewing court's focus squarely on the relevant question from an
agency theory perspective: not, what interpretation would the court choose,
but how justifiable is the interpretation chosen by the agency?
Although the factors expressly named in Skidmore do not speak directly
to agency expertise, 230 some commentators have understood Skidmore to peg
deference to expertise, 231 and courts have sometimes applied it that way as
well.232 There may be good reasons to defer more to agencies with strong
subject-specific expertise, but focusing exclusively on expertise leaves
agencies no incentive to subvert their own policy preferences in favor of
fidelity to the statutes they administer. Even if courts consider expertise in
228. On argumentation frameworks in law, see generally Alec Stone Sweet, Path Dependence,
Precedent,and JudicialPower, in ON LAW, POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION 112 (Martin Shapiro &
Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002) and Giovanni Sartor, A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation, 7
RATIO JURIS 177 (1994).
229. See supra section Il(B)(2).
230. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
231. Krotoszynski, supra note 137, at 754.
232. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 125, at 1288-89 (noting that many courts' deferential
application of the Skidmore standard considered agency expertise).
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their Skidmore analysis, courts should also consider the content of agencies'
interpretations and the justifications agencies offer for them. As Hickman
and Krueger found, the sliding-scale model of Skidmore review is already
dominant on the circuit courts,233 although both the circuit courts and the
Supreme Court rely on their independent judgment in a significant share of
cases. 234 To the extent that the Supreme Court can signal in its decisions that
this is at the core of Skidmore analysis, the Skidmore lottery can exert a more
consistent and effective pull on agency behavior.
Also, as I discussed above, the deference lottery works best if, when
Chevron is applied, it is applied predictably and with a good deal of
deference. There are three ways in which courts could diverge from this
ideal.
On the one hand, rather than deferring to any reasonable
interpretation, broadly construed, courts could apply more scrutiny to the
agency's interpretation and rationale, so that Chevron, too, functions as a
kind of sliding-scale review. Convergence between Chevron and Skidmore is
not necessarily undesirable, 2 35 but it may induce agencies to play it safer with
their interpretations than is optimal. When Chevron becomes Skidmore-light,
the deference lottery becomes less flexible as a tool to regulate agency
behavior. The second divergence from the idealized Chevron outlined here
is the "Crapshoot Chevron" described in subpart III(C), in which the
outcomes of judicial review within Chevron vary unpredictably. Crapshoot
Chevron likewise reduces the deference lottery's ability to shape agency
behavior, and it also translates into more judicial reversals with no gains in
terms of agency fidelity.236 The third divergence is that courts can give
Chevron deference at different rates to different agencies. We know that
there is currently cross-agency variation within the Chevron lottery. 2 37 To
the extent that agencies face different Chevron lotteries, of course, the
deference regime as a whole gives them different incentives. Barring
grounds for differential treatment-such as a judicial judgment that some
agencies can be trusted with discretion more than others-the Supreme Court
would do well to subject all agencies to the same lottery, and there are some
signs that such a convergence is underway.23 8
In a legal regime, clarity has value, but sometimes unpredictability does
too. This Article has argued that the deference regime agencies face when

233. Id. at 1238.
234. Id.; see also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1090 ("[I]n the majority of cases-53.6%
of them-the Court does not apply any deference regime at all."). When we confine our attention to
agency statutory interpretations offered in formal adjudications or notice-and-comment
rulemakings, the Eskridge and Baer data show that the Supreme Court still reviews the agency
without reference to any deference standard in 16% of the cases.
235. See Zaring,supra note 97, at 137 (arguing that the various standards for reviewing agency
action have already converged into a single "reasonableness" standard).
236. See supra notes 214-30 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 107.
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they seek to defend their statutory interpretations in court amounts to a
lottery, and that a lottery can be an effective tool for managing agency
behavior. If it were possible to craft legal standards with laser-like precision,
if there were no variability in how judges applied standards, and if courts
were devising a deference regime against a blank slate, there would be little
to recommend a deference lottery. But given the incomplete determinacy of
any legal standard, the variability in judicial behavior, and Chevron's place
in precedent as a default rule, the deference lottery approach may be the best
available option for appropriately structuring the relationship between courts
and agencies.

